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ABSTRACT
This article examines a paradox found in public law cases. While
justiciability doctrines aim to provide concrete context for adjudication of
public law questions by insisting upon individual injury, often the Supreme
Court ignores the litigants’ injuries when it turns to the merits of cases.
Examination of this paradox leads to a fuller appreciation of the structure
and nature of public law. In particular, it sheds light on a recent debate in
leading law reviews about whether constitutional litigation should be seen
as about individual rights or the validity of legal rules. It also raises serious
questions about the modern doctrine of standing.
Alexander Bickel’s influential writing on the “passive virtues”
views justiciability doctrines as an aid to wise decision making. Bickel
emphasized that the law of standing would provide concrete information
about the consequences of laws undergoing judicial review that would
contribute to sounder more enduring judgments as to constitutionality.
Analysis of the reasons that information regarding injury often has no
influence upon the merits of many public law cases casts doubt on
justiciability doctrines’ capacity to aid wise decision-making. Courts need
to adopt a new set of “active virtues”, a set of practices governing the
framing, consideration, and resolution of the merits of public law cases.
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Standing for Nothing:
The Paradox of Demanding Concrete Contexts for Formalist
Adjudication
David M. Driesen*
INTRODUCTION
In 1996, Congress passed the Line Item Veto Act (Act).1 The Act
addressed the problem of “pork barrel spending” - a representative’s
insertion of line items into the federal budget for projects of dubious
general value that deliver federal money to the representative’ home
district.2 This pork barrel spending had made it very difficult to properly
manage the federal budget.3 Absent authority to veto each line item, the
President could only combat pork barrel spending by vetoing the entire
federal budget, which might well shut down the federal government.4
The day after the Act went into effect, six members of Congress
brought suit to challenge the Act’s constitutionality.5 After the District
Court declared the Act unconstitutional, the Supreme Court agreed to hear
the case under the statute’s provision for expedited review.6
The Supreme Court held that the Congressmen did not allege a

*

J.D. Yale Law School 1989. Associate Professor, Syracuse University College
of Law. The author wishes to thank Matthew Adler, Peter Bell, Richard Fallon, Robert
Pushaw, and Harry Wellington for helpful comments, Syracuse University College of Law
and its Dean, Hannah Arterian, for research support, Peter Rolph, Melissa Pennington, and
Jeff Philps for research assistance, and the students in my citizen suit seminar for their
insights and research. Of course, the article reflects my views and I take responsibility for
any errors.
1

See Pub. L. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200, codified at 2 U.S.C. § 691 et seq. (1994 ed.,

Supp. 1).
2

See Mary E. Foster, The Line Item Veto Act After Raines v. Byrd, 20 T.
JEFFERSON L. REV. 323, 323 (1998).
3

See Gordon T. Butler, The Line Item Veto and the Tax Legislative Process: A
Futile Effort at Deficit Reduction, But a Step Toward Tax Integrity, 49 HASTINGS L. J. 1,
6 (1997) (discussion of conditions and budgetary outcomes associated with pork barrel
spending).
4
Anthony R. Petrilla, The Role of the Line-Item Veto in the Federal Balance of
Power, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 469, 479 (1993) (Presidential veto of a budget bill laden with
riders of dubious merit can shut down the federal government).
5
6

See Raines v. Bryd, 521 U.S. 811, 814 (1997).
See id. at 817 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 692(b),(c)).
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“sufficiently concrete injury to have established Article III standing.”7 The
Court linked its concern with concrete injury to the need to adjudicate
disputes “traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the
judicial process.”8 The Court contrasted a suit based on concrete injury
with “amorphous general supervision of” government operations.9 This
suggests that concrete injury would render the litigation itself more
concrete and less “amorphous.” And indeed, the Court and commentators
have both linked the requirement of concrete injury to a desire for more
concrete adjudication.10
Justice Souter wrote separately, in part, because he believed that the
Congressmens’ injury might satisfy “the requirement of concreteness.”11
Justice Souter, however, concurred in the end, because he thought it
prudent to avoid immediate involvement in a dispute between two branches
of the federal government and await a case involving more “concrete”
injury.12
Justice Breyer, in dissent, even more clearly linked the concept of
concrete injury to the hope for concrete adjudication. He viewed the
question of standing as, in part, a question of whether “the dispute” is
“concrete.”13 Standing should exist, Breyer writes, because the plaintiffs
ask the court to determine “a concrete living contest,” rather than an
“abstract intellectual problem.”14
Litigants with sufficiently concrete injuries to justify standing
subsequently challenged the Act in Clinton v. City of New York15. The
majority opinion in Clinton describes the facts giving rise to these injuries
7

See id. at 830. Cf. Tracy Rottner Yu, Note, Standing in a Quagmire: Raines v.
Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312 (1997), 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 639, 658-668 (1999) (critiquing the
Court’s reasoning supporting this conclusion, but agreeing with the result); Leading Case,
Separation of Powers - Congressional Standing, 111 HARV. L. REV. 217, 227 (1997)
(criticizing Court’s confusion of the law of legislative standing); Note, Standing in the Way
of Separation of Powers: The Consequences of Raines v. Bird, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1741
(1999) (criticizing Raines).
8
See Raines, 521 U.S. at 819 (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968)).
9
See id. at 829 (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974)).
10
See, e.g., Babbitt v. United Farm Workers National Union, 442 U.S. 289, 297
(1979) (distinguishing between a case or controversy and “abstract questions.”);
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 111-198 (2nd ed. 1986).
11

See Raines, 521 U.S. at 831 (Souter J., concurring).
See id. at 832-34.
13
See id. at 839 (Breyer J., dissenting) [emphasis added].
14
See id. at 839-40 [emphasis added].
15
524 U.S. 417 (1998).
12
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in detail.16 New York City and certain health care providers faced potential
losses of federal monies financing medical care of the indigent, because of
President Clinton’s veto of a line item giving New York favorable
treatment with respect to Medicaid.17 A farmer’s cooperative faced the loss
of a potential tax benefit, because of another line item veto.18 The Court
found these economic injuries sufficiently concrete to justify standing.19
Waiting for plaintiffs with concrete injuries to sue, however, did not
lead to especially concrete adjudication. Rather, Clinton treats the
constitutionality of the line item veto as an “abstract intellectual problem,”
which the Court resolved through a formalist approach. The injuries
discussed in such detail at the outset of the opinion play almost no role in
the subsequent discussion of the merits.
The majority analogized the line item veto to “repeal of a statute.”20
Since the Constitution does not authorize Presidential repeal of legislation,
reasoned the majority, the statute authorizing Presidential veto of line items
conflicts with the Constitution.21 It bolstered this reasoning by explaining
that the statute as modified by exercise of the line item veto did not receive
the approval of the House and Senate, as required by Article I, § 7 of the
Constitution.22 This reasoning makes no reference to injuries, but only to
the content of the constitution and the statute.
The Clinton majority refused to analogize the line item veto to the
veto of a bill under Article I, § 7 of the Constitution. The Court explained
that the traditional veto only applies to an entire bill and only after the
President has signed it into law.23 By contrast, the line item veto applies to
parts of bills and comes before the bill is signed into law.24 This formal
distinction also depends not at all upon the nature of injuries incurred under
the statute. Indeed, it would exist with no injury at all. The opinion’s basic
affirmative argument, that the line item veto conflicts with the constitution,
because the constitution does not expressly authorize it,25 contains not a

16

See id. at 421-36.
See id. at 422-23, 426, 430-31.
18
See id. at 423-24, 426-27, 432-36.
19
See id. at 429-436.
20
See id. at 438.
21
See id. at 438-39.
17

22

See id. at 448-49.
See id. at 439.
24
See id.
25
See id. at 448 (“our decision rests on the narrow ground” that the Constitution
(continued...)
23
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single reference to the injury that the Court found so necessary to its
constitutional adjudication.26
The government analogized the line item veto act to delegation of
discretionary power to the President, which the Court has upheld. It relied
upon Field v. Clark,27 which upheld legislation delegating discretionary
authority to impose a tariff in the face of a claim that the statute
unconstitutionally delegated legislative authority to the President. The
government’s analogy persuaded Justices Scalia, Breyer and O’Connor that
the statute should be upheld.28
Neither the majority nor the dissent found the concrete factual
context of the Clinton case important in deciding whether to accept the
analogy to Field v. Clark. Indeed, none of the justices directly mention the
injuries giving rise to justicability in discussing the argument at the heart
of the government’s case,29 and these injuries receive only cursory mention
25

(...continued)
does not authorize the Line Item Veto Act’s procedures).
26
See id. at 436-40.
27
143 U.S. 649 (1892).
28
See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 463-69, 473-497 (dissenting opinions).
29
The majority rejected the analogy to Field v. Clark for three reasons. First, the
power to levy a tariff at issue in Field only came into play when a new condition arose,
whilst exercise of the line item veto would occur without new conditions arising. See id.
at 443. Second, while the Line Item Veto Act only authorized vetoes, the Tariff Act
required imposition of tariffs when the relevant condition arose. See id. at 443-44. Third,
the Presidential imposition of a tariff reflected Congressional policy found in the Tariff
Act. See id. at 444. By contrast, the President relies upon his own policy judgment in
exercising the line item veto. See id. The first two reasons involve comparisons between
the Tariff Act and the Line Item Veto Act with no reference at all to the facts of the Clinton
case. See id. at 443-44. In making the third argument, however, the Court does cite the
particular reason President Clinton gave for one of his vetoes of a line item to show that
Presidential judgment operates. See id. at 444 n. 35. But this does not amount to a
reference to the injury giving rise to standing. In the end, the Court relied on a purely
formalist acontextual argument to justify rejection the Field analogy. Unlike predecessor
statutes, wrote the majority, the Line Item Veto Act “gives the President the unilateral
authority to change the text of duly enacted statutes.” Id. at 447.
The dissent’s reasoning also depended in no way upon the nature of the injuries
incurred by plaintiffs in the case. Justice Scalia explained that “there is not a dime’s worth
of difference between Congress’s authorizing the President to cancel a spending item, and
Congress’s authorizing money to be spent on a particular item at the President’s
discretion.” Id. at 466 (Scalia J., dissenting). Justice Scalia then relies on the long history
of authorization of discretionary spending to justify upholding the Act. See id. at 466-69.
His argument combines analogy with an appeal to history, without a single reference to the
concrete context provided by having injured plaintiffs before the Court.
Justice Breyer in dissent likewise referred not at all to the injuries making the case
(continued...)
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in the discussion of subsidiary arguments30.
This case illustrates the paradox this article will explore. On the
one hand, the Supreme Court has insisted on justicability criteria that aim
to make adjudication concrete, rather than abstract. On the other hand, it
often relies upon abstract formalist reasoning to resolve cases on the merits,
thereby getting no benefit from the concrete context.
This concreteness paradox leads to fresh questions both about the
so-called passive virtues, devices for avoiding decisions until an issue has

29

(...continued)
justicable. He develops an illustration of his logic for rejecting the majority’s conclusion
from one of the particular line items President Clinton has vetoed, but does not refer to the
injury the veto of that line item produced. See id. at 474 (Breyer J., dissenting). Moreover,
he supplements this illustration with another example, from the law of trust and estates, that
has no connection with the facts of the case at all. See id. at 476. Breyer reads the statute
as allowing the President to exercise delegated authority as in Field for reasons having
nothing to do with the injuries inflicted in the Clinton case.
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion claims that the Act threatens the liberties
of individual citizens. See id. at 449-53 (Kennedy J., concurring). In making this argument
about the Act’s effects he refers not once to the litigants’ injuries or liberty interests. See
id.
30
The Court’s refutation of one of the governments’ subsidiary arguments refers
to the injuries the actual plaintiffs incurred, but this reference appears incidental. The
government relied upon the “lockbox provisions” of the statute to argue against the
characterization of the line item veto as a repeal of part of a statute. See id. at 440. Since
that provision has a legal effect even after the line item veto’s exercise - forbidding
spending of the cancelled monies on other priorities -, the government argued that the veto
amounted to something less than repeal of the line item. See id. at 440-41. The Court
responded to that argument with a reference to the injuries justifying standing. The Court
explained that the cancelled line items do withdraw benefits from the litigants in the case.
See id. at 441. But this reference seems merely illustrative. The statute itself made it
obvious that cancellation of a line item would prevent the expenditure of the relevant funds,
and would therefore prevent somebody from receiving something. The validity of this
argument in no way depends upon the deprivation of funds actually injuring anybody.
Even if the hospital losing medicare funding escaped injury by making up the funding loss
from new private donations, the statute would nevertheless have the feature that troubled
the Court. And certainly nothing about the particular injury incurred by the hospital, the
loss of funding for the indigent, matters at all to the lockbox argument. The Court rejects
the lockbox argument on the grounds that a repeal of the expenditure alone does constitute
at least a “partial repeal” of the line item. This argument rests upon abstract reasoning, not
any particular injury. Cf. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)
(requiring plaintiff to have “particularized” injury).
The Breyer dissent’s rejoinder to the majority’s lockbox argument does not
mention injury at all. See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 478-79. He accepts the government’s
argument that the lockbox feature does not constitute a repeal, and argues that it supports
his conclusion that the Act delegates executive authority to the President. See id. at 47880.
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become concrete and well developed, and about formalism.31 What
precisely is the value of a concrete context for adjudication? Do we want
judges to respond to injuries of the litigants who come before them, or, in
the words of Justice Roberts, to “lay the . . . Constitution . . . beside the
statute” to see whether the statute conflicts with that grand document?32 If
judges should respond to the injuries they see, how should those injuries
influence them? Are some types of legal questions inherently abstract?
And if so, what value does requiring injury-in-fact have for adjudication?
Part one of this article explores the role concreteness plays in the
Court’s justiciability jurisprudence, with some emphasis upon the doctrine
of standing. This part also discusses the role that abstract formalism plays
in merits adjudication, with emphasis upon separation of powers
jurisprudence.
Part two will test the hypothesis that the Line Item Veto cases
suggest: that standing requirements do not give rise to concrete
adjudication. It examines numerous Supreme Court cases to see whether
plaintiff’s standing makes merits adjudication more concrete. It then draws
some conclusions about the relationship between standing and concreteness
in adjudication.
Part three develops the theoretical implications of the concreteness
paradox. Analysis of the paradox shows that the Court has not adequately
justified the law of standing and illuminates the fundamental structure of
public law.33 The article closes with recommendation for a new set of
“active virtues,” a set of practices to follow in resolving, rather than
avoiding, the resolution of the merits of cases.
I. CONCRETENESS AND ABSTRACTNESS IN CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION

31
32

See BICKEL, supra note 10, at 111-198 (chapter on the “passive virtues”).

United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936). See also Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803) (describing judicial review as an exercise in resolving
conflicts between the statutory law and the constitution); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 at 525
(Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (same).
33
I define public law as law creating obligations for government. Accord
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67-68 (1982)
(plurality opinion). This includes constitutional and most administrative law. By contrast
private law involves questions of one individual’s liability to another. Id. at 69-70. This
definition is not uncontroversial nor does it resolve all issues. See Thomas v. Union
Carbide Agric. Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 600 (1985) (Blackmun J., concurring)
(concluding that case about scheme creating rights between private parties should be
thought of as providing public rights, because public purposes pervade the scheme); Owen
M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term: Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 35-36 (1979) (defining all rights enforced by courts as public) .
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This part describes the law of standing and several related
justiciability doctrines. It then presents some information about the role of
formalism in constitutional adjudication. It closes with an effort to
elucidate what scholars, lawyers, and judges mean when they distinguish
between abstract and concrete cases.34 This part’s description highlights
the importance of the concreteness ideal, the notion that only concrete,
rather than abstract, cases should be justiciable under Article III.35
A. CONCRETENESS AND THE LAW OF STANDING
The Supreme Court has held that federal courts may only exercise
jurisdiction over cases brought by plaintiffs that have “standing” to bring
the claim. The modern standing doctrine put an emphasis on concreteness
from the beginning.36
In Baker v. Carr,37 the Court asked whether the appellants have
“alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.”38 It described this inquiry as “the gist of the
question of standing.”39 Thus, the Baker Court set up assurance of
“concrete adverseness” as the measuring rod for an adequate “personal
stake” in a case.40 Concrete adverseness, claims the Baker Court, “sharpens
presentation of issues” to “illuminate difficult constitutional questions.”41
The Court went on to grant standing to voters challenging redistricting
under the equal protection clause.42 In a separate passage, the Court
formulated the modern political question doctrine and held that the
constitutionality of redistricting under the equal protection clause posed a

34

Cf. Babbitt v. United Farm Workers National Union, 442 U.S. 289, 297 (1979)
(distinguishing between a case or controversy and “abstract questions.”)
35

See id.
The modern doctrine has some early antecedents. See, e.g., Fairchild v. Hughes,
258 U.S. 126, 129 (1924) (general interest in law enforcement insufficient basis for lawsuit
to void the 19th Amendment).
37
369 U.S. 186 (1962)
36

38

Id. at 204.
Id.
40
See id.
41
See id.
42
Id. at 206.
39
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justiciable legal question.43 By treating standing as a separate doctrinal
issue, the Court began the modern movement toward formulating a distinct
standing doctrine.
Five years later, the Court elaborated upon the Baker Court’s
statement that the gist of the standing inquiry addressed concreteness
concerns in Flast v. Cohen.44 It identified standing doctrine with avoidance
of “ill-defined controversies over constitutional issues” and cases of a
“hypothetical or abstract character.”45 Thus, the Court relied heavily upon
a dichotomy between abstract and concrete cases to justify a standing
requirement. Noting confusion in prior cases regarding what standing
addressed, the Court, building on what Baker had done, explained that
standing addressed the question of “who is a proper party to request
adjudication of a particular issue” and “not whether the issue itself is
justiciable.”46
The Flast Court went on to link standing’s concrete adverseness
requirement not just to sharp presentation of issues - a concern that seems
to address how well arguments about a pre-determined issue are made, but
to the very definition of the issue before the Court.47 It also identified
standing with vigorous pursuit of litigation.48 Finally, the Flast Court
claimed that framing of specific issues, “adverseness”, and vigorous
litigation would “assure that the constitutional challenge will be made in a
form traditionally thought to be capable of judicial resolution.”49 Thus, the
Flast Court created a concept of a proper case as one where “concrete
adverseness” creates specific issues vigorously litigated by opposing
parties.
At the time of Flast and Baker, the Court employed a “legal
interest” test to implement the concern over “concrete adverseness.”50
When the Court substituted an injury-in-fact test requiring past or likely
future injury for the legal interest test in Barlow v. Collins51 and

43

Id. at 209-236.
392 U.S. 83 (1968).
45
Id. at 100 (citations omitted).
46
Id. at 99-100.
47
See id. at 100 (Court demands a “proper party” to avoid “ill-defined
controversies”).
44

48

See id. at 106.
See id. at 106.
50
See generally, Gene R. Nichol, Injury and the Disintegration of Article III, 74
CAL. L. REV. 1915, 1920 (1986) (describing the legal interest test).
51
397 U.S. 159, 163-164 (1970)
49
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Association of Data Processors Service Organization v. Camp52 in 1970,
it continued to treat “concrete adverseness” as central to the standing
inquiry.53 An injury-in-fact requirement became the means of ensuring the
concrete adverseness that standing doctrine demands.54
“Concrete adverseness” remained central as the Court developed the
standing doctrine further. In the 1970s, the Court added to the “injury-infact” test it first articulated at the beginning of that decade, requiring a
causal link between the alleged injury and the challenged action, and a
likelihood that a favorable judgment will redress the injury alleged.55 The
Court repeatedly cited Baker’s “concrete adverseness” language to justify
all of these requirements and often linked standing even more directly to a
concern for concrete merits adjudication.56
For many years, the Court generally treated standing as amenable
to legislative control.57 Barlow, however, began a slow shift toward
constitutionalizing a core set of standing elements as required by Article

52

397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970) (“The first question is whether the plaintiff alleges
that the challenged action has caused him injury in fact.”)
53
See Barlow, 397 U.S. at 164, 170 (majority and concurring opinion)
54
See id. at 163-164, 170-173 (majority and concurring opinions). Cf. Gladstone
Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979) (requiring actual or “threatened”
injury).
55

See Robert J. Pushaw, Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A NeoFederalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 475 (1996) (discussing Burger Court’s
creation of causation and redressability requirements). See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 505 (1975) (indirect link between defendant’s action and plaintiff’s harm may make
required showing of causation and redressability under article III more difficult); Linda
R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617-18 (1973) (declining standing on ground of an
insufficient link between plaintiff alleged injury, deprivation of child support, and the
challenged action, non-enforcement of child support order).; Simon v. Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41 (1976) (demanding redressability and causation);
United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973) (plaintiff must allege that he was
injured or will be injured by the challenged action).
56
See, e.g., Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 616-18 (citing need for concrete adverseness
and then creating a causation requirement out of demand for a real injury); Simon, 426 U.S.
at 38, 41 (linking causation to concrete adverseness and then equating redressability with
causation); Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583, 586-87 (1972) (“federal courts
do not decide abstract questions posed by parties who lack `a personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy’”) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)); Trafficante v.
Metropolitan Life Ins., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972) (because plaintiffs allege injury with
particularity, no “abstract question” is present).
57
See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of
Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 885 (1983) (existence of standing is
largely with the control of Congress). See, e.g., Barlow, 397 U.S. at 164-165 (analyzing
question of standing primarily as one of legislative intent);
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III’s language authorizing adjudication of cases or controversies.58 This
shift culminated more than twenty years later in the Court’s first decision
explicitly overruling a clear Congressional grant of standing, Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife.59
Concrete adverseness assumed a leading role in this transformation.
In Barlow, the Court suggested that Article III required concrete
adverseness.60 In Valley Forge College v. Americans United61, the Court
made its growing concept of a concrete case a central element linking
article III to the burgeoning standing requirements.62 Valley Forge claims
that a redressable injury tends “to assure” that the Court will resolve legal
questions “in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic
appreciation of the consequences of judicial action,” and identifies this
policy of using the context facts about injury provide to understand
consequences as an “implicit policy of Article III.”63 Hence, by the 1970s
the Court had identified standing with concreteness in order to encourage
good arguments about issues, sharp framing of what the issues are, and
judicial appreciation of the consequences of possible decisions.64
While the Court has repeated the “concrete adverseness” phrase in
numerous of cases,65 it has never explained its meaning. The concept of

58

See Barlow, 397 U.S. at 164 (dicta referring to article III); Scalia, supra note
57, at 885 (describing standing in the mid-1980s as a combination of prudential limits and
a constitutional core).
59
504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (denying standing under a statute granting any
person a right to sue).
60
Barlow, 397 U.S. at 164.
61
454 U.S. 464 (1981).
62
See id. at 472; Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem
of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1379 (1988) (the Burger Court added causation
as an element of standing doctrine in the 1970s).
63

Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472.
See William A. Fletcher, 98 YALE L. J. 221, 222 (1988) (describing the litany
that mentions standing doctrine’s purpose of ensuring that a concrete case informs the
Court of the consequences of its decision as “numbingly familiar”).
64

65

See Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 245 (1990)
(describing a personal stake assuring concrete adverseness as the test for standing). See,
e.g., Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115, 125-26 (1991) (unanimous opinion); International
Primate Protection League v. Administrators of Tulane Educ. Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 78
(1991); Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 65 n. 5 (1987);
United Auto Workers v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 289 (1986); Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S.
54, 61-62 (1986); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804 (1985); INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 939-40 (1983); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 103, 101
(1983); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 238-39 (1982); Valley Forge, 454 U.S.at 486; Orr
(continued...)
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"adverseness" seems to demand two parties to litigation that genuinely
oppose each other. That term standing alone would indicate the need to
avoid advisory opinions - opinions sought by one party who does not ask
for a binding judgment and faces no opposition.66 It also suggests
disapproval of sham litigation, in which two parties in fact want the same
result from a case, but contrive a dispute to get the Court ruling that both
desire.
Most commentators agree, however, that the Court does not need
to require injury, causation, and redressability to assure the existence of a
real dispute between two parties.67 Two parties may have a dispute
rendering them adverse to each other even if the plaintiff suffers no injury.
Indeed, several commentators, including Justice Scalia, have suggested that
an ideological plaintiff might litigate more vigorously than one who has
simply suffered an injury.68 As long as two parties genuinely disagree and
the plaintiff seeks a judgment, not just advice, we have adverse litigation

65

(...continued)
v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 273 (1979); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group, 438 U.S.
59, 72 (1977); Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 345 (1976);
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 52-53 (1976);
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 181 (1974); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488,
494 (1974).
66
See generally Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV.
L. REV. 40, 42 (1961) (suggesting that standing is a shorthand for ideas related to avoiding
advisory opinions).
67

See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 64, at 247 (explaining that standing is not a good
protection against advisory opinions); Pushaw, supra note 55, at 462 (arguing that Justice
Frankfurter “cleverly co-opted the historical term `advisory opinion’ and gave it a new
meaning” by linking it to standing, ripeness, and mootness).
68
See Scalia, supra note 57, at 891 (standing doctrine is “ill designed” to assure
the concrete adverseness which sharpens presentation of issues, since the “very best
adversaries” are national organization with a “keen interest in the abstract questions at
issue in the case”); Mark Tushnet, The Sociology of Article III: A Response to Professor
Brillmayer, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1698, 1704 (1980) (the Court recognizes that an organization
will often be a more effective litigant than an individual); Henry P. Monaghan,
Constitutional Adjudication:The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1385 (1973) (there
is no reason to believe that litigants with a personal interest will present issues more
sharply or ably than the Sierra Club or the ACLU.); Sax, Standing to Sue: A Critical
Review of the Mineral King Decision, 13 NAT. RES. J. 76, 82 (1973) (Sierrra Club would
make a better plaintiff than a park user for the Mineral King litigation); Louis J. Jaffe, The
Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U.
PA. L. REV. 1033 (1968). Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public
Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1, 49-50 (1984)
(a plaintiff who is willing to pay for litigation probably feels a personal stake in the
outcome).
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quite different from a request for a non-binding advisory opinion.69
The standing test does not focus on the factors one should evaluate
to avoid advisory opinions.70 The injury-in-fact, causation, and
redressability requirements do not require an adverse party, since they
typically focus only upon the plaintiff.71 While the plaintiff must trace her
injury to a challenged action and argue that a judicial order would remedy
the harm, she need not show that the defendant opposes the order she
seeks.72 In that sense standing doctrine is underinclusive as a means of
avoiding advisory opinions.73 In another sense, standing is overinclusive.
When a court issues an order after hearing from a proponent and opponent
of the order, it has not issued an advisory opinion, even if the court order
requested does not remedy the plaintiff’s concrete injury. It has issued an
order limiting defendant’s conduct, not a response to a unilateral request for
advice.74 Since the Court has a separate doctrine prohibiting advisory
opinions, it does not need a standing doctrine to perform this function.75
Sham litigation might well include a plaintiff who can meet the
requisites of standing, so constitutional standing requirements seem illsuited to the task of avoiding sham litigation as well. Detecting the sham
would require a comparison between the interests of the plaintiffs and the
defendants to determine whether they coincide,76 but the three-part

69

See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Court Should Have Remained Silent: Why the
Court Erred in Deciding Dickerson v. United States, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 305-306
(2000) (prohibition of advisory opinions requires that judgment must have some effect).
70
See Fletcher, supra note 64, at 247 (standing doctrine is not a particularly good
protection against advisory opinions).
71
See Ellen J. Bullock, Acid Rain Falls on the Just and the Unjust: Why
Standing’s Criteria Should not be Incorporated into Intervention of Right, 1990 U. ILL. L.
REV.605, 641 (“standing is overwhelmingly a plaintiff’s hurdle”). Cf. Virginia v. Hicks,
48 U.S.L.W. 4411, 4433 (2003) (basing standing to review a state court decision on the
injury to the defendant stemming from the lower court ruling on behalf of a plaintiff).
72
See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 935-36 (1983) (holding that Chadha meets
causation and redressability requirements, even though the INS supports his position).
73
See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 69, at 289-91, 304-07 (Court issued an
advisory opinion when it ruled on the constitutionality of a statute challenging Miranda at
the behest of an amicus when no party to the case raised the issue).
74

See Robert J. Pushaw, Article III’s Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual
Functions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 513-14 (1994) (early Supreme
Court cases on advisory opinions only insist that resolution of a case must be “final . . . and
public”).
75
See Pushaw, supra note 55, at 442-444 (questioning the conventional
understanding of advisory opinions).
76
See, e.g., Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1911) (no jurisdiction
without truly adverse parties); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 931 n. 6 (1983) (finding
(continued...)
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constitutional test for standing does not focus upon this comparison.77 And
sincere ideological plaintiffs experiencing no personal injury do not present
sham litigation if they seek a judgment against an opponent.
Of course, no doctrine perfectly achieves its intended purpose, so
a showing of underinclusion and overinclusion by itself does not
necessarily establish a fatal defect. But standing doctrine prohibits so much
genuinely adversarial litigation (flowing from ideological conflict without
injury), and fails so completely to capture the rare case that is not truly
adversarial (sham litigation), that the assurance of “adverseness” cannot
count as a substantial justification for standing doctrine.
Since the concept of adverseness does not, by itself, explain injurybased standing’s constitutional status, the idea that the adverseness must be
"concrete" should help explain the mystery. But here the Court’s poor use
of the English language hinders understanding.78 The phrase "concrete
adverseness" does not have any readily apparent meaning.79 Parties either

76

(...continued)
jurisdiction, even though the INS sided with Chadha, because of intervention of both
houses of Congress in opposition).
77

See Bullock, supra note 71, at 641 (“standing is overwhelmingly a plaintiff’s

hurdle”).
78

Cf. Richard H. Fallon Jr., Marbury and the Constitutional Mind: A Bicentennial
Essay on the Wages of Doctrinal Tension, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1, 33 (2003) (partially correcting
the Court’s usage by translating concrete adverseness as “concrete adversity between the
parties”).
79

The Court’s usage taken out of context might suggest that it intends to
distinguish concrete from abstract adversarial relationships. Thinking of relationships
between people, or worse, between institutions (since many cases have institutional
defendants and plaintiffs) as either abstract or concrete, however, seems unusual and not
entirely clear. Would such a concept distinguish between cases where the plaintiffs and
defendants know each other prior to the litigation (concrete adverseness) and those where
they do not (abstract adverseness)? Would it distinguish litigation involving personal
insults (concrete adverseness) from litigation involving impersonal legal arguments
(abstract adverseness)? Would it mean to distinguish cases where the litigants have
adverse interests about some matter of principle (abstract adverseness) from cases where
they have a narrower disagreement (concrete adverseness). None of these ideas seems
central to standing. For once injury occurs, disagreement can be as impersonal or
principled as the litigants wish.
Moreover, it’s very hard to see why the concreteness of the relationship between
plaintiff and defendant should hinge upon the existence of an injury to the plaintiff. For
example, the Court has held that litigants seeking to challenge government administration
of laws protecting endangered species who have have no concrete plans to see them
generally cannot claim injury-in-fact. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
564, 579 (1992) By contrast, litigants that have such plans can claim injury. See id. at
579. Yet, in either case the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant is basically the
same. The plaintiff believes that the government defendant has misconstrued the law and
failed to take actions that should help protect the species. It sues the government for relief.
(continued...)
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are adverse or they are not.
The Court’s repeated insistence that concrete adverseness should
sharpen presentation of arguments, illuminate difficult questions, and
frame issues helps.80 Surely, this view suggests that standing requirements
make the case itself more concrete. That is, parties meeting the injury-infact test will present a more concrete case, thereby making issues more
concrete, and creating more concrete results. This reading also comports
with important early antecedents of modern standing doctrine.81
Of course, the Court may simply mean that cases involving an
injured plaintiff create a concrete adverse relationship, while cases
involving a plaintiff experiencing no injury-in-fact involve an abstract
adverse relationship. If so, the Court has simply stated the requirement for
injury-in-fact twice, once clearly and once obliquely, without explaining
why article III demands an injury-in-fact requirement.
Indeed, any coherent explanation of why Article III’s conferral of
jurisdiction over "cases or controversies" bars litigation brought without
standing must hinge on some judicial definition of cases (and
controversies).82 Hence, the Court must mean that the concreteness it seeks
applies to the case - i.e. the adjudication of the merits of controversies.
The suggestion that justiciability doctrines, such as the doctrine of
79

(...continued)
Unless one imagines that the intensity of the adversarial relationship varies with the
concreteness of the injury, it’s hard to distinguish the relationship between the injured
plaintiff and the government from the relationship between the non-injured plaintiff and
the government.
80
See, e.g., O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974) (quoting Baker on these
points).
81

See United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89-90 (1947) (identifying
“concrete legal issues . . . not abstractions” as requisite for constitutional litigation and
expressing concern about the lack of specific facts about which of plaintiff’s activities the
challenged Hatch Act prohibited); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485-87 (1923)
(rejecting taxpayer standing to challenge grant program under the Maternity Act because
it raises abstract questions of political power under the Tenth Amendment); Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 236, 241-242 (1937) (describing a legal dispute about Haworth’s
disability as satisfying requirement for a concrete dispute touching a legal relationship
between parties); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 324 (1936) (Brandeis J. concurring)
(calling for action of a concrete character, rather than determination of abstract questions);
United States v. Alaska S.S. Co., 253 U.S. 113, 116 (1920) (Court will not decide
“abstract” questions of law that will not affect the case); Liverpool Steamship Co. v.
Commissioners of Immigration, 113 U.S. 33, 38-39 (1885) (describing question of whether
Congress constitutionally sanctioned collection of head monies as abstract when state law
may not have authorized the collection); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, 75 (1831)
(refusing to render an abstract opinion about the constitutionality of state law).
82
See Arizonan for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 65 (1997) (standing
is an aspect of the “case-or-controversy” requirement of Article III). See generally
Pushaw, supra note 74, 82 (arguing that cases mean something different from
controversies).
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standing, aim to make litigation more concrete has firm roots in
constitutional scholarship.83 This suggestion played a leading role in
Alexander Bickel’s writing about "passive virtues," techniques for avoiding
or delaying constitutional decision-making in the Supreme Court.84 Bickel
has suggested that justiciability doctrines, doctrines allowing the Court to
avoid deciding cases otherwise properly before the Court, help the Court
make wise decisions.85 Bickel suggests that concrete litigation makes wise
decisions more likely and that the standing requirement fosters concrete
The Court has also explained that separation of powers
litigation.86
requires standing.87 It regards standing as a tool to make sure that courts
stay within their properly limited role under the constitution and do not
usurp the powers of the executive or legislative branches of government.88
Even though the Court’s increased reliance upon separation of powers
seems to have led to somewhat less emphasis on concrete adverseness,

83

See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 68, at 14 (concrete injury frames litigation in a
factual context suitable for judicial resolution); Monaghan, supra note 68, at 1372
(“constitutional questions” must “be presented in a manner sufficiently concrete for
resolution of the problem.”).
84
See BICKEL, supra note 10, at 111-198 (chapter on the “passive virtues”). See
also Pushaw, supra note 55, at 465 (Bickel’s idea of passive virtues had a “lasting”
influence on the Court); Mathew D. Alder, Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State:
Beyond the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 145 PENN. L. REV. 759, 760 (1997) (Bickel’s
“masterpiece”, The Least Dangerous Branch, is “the most important work of constitutional
scholarship in the last half-century”); Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic
Obsession: the History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 Yale L. J.
153, 201 (2002) (describing Bickel’s framing of the “countermajoritarian difficulty” in The
Least Dangerous Branch as “catching the attention of the ages”).
85
See BICKEL, supra note 10, at 115 (concepts of standing and case or controversy
lead to “sounder and more enduring judgments”). See also Michael Dorf, Facial
Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 246 (1994) (assuming that
courts function best when presented with concrete controversies).
86

See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 10, at 115-117 (linking standing and case or
controversy to concrete adjudication exemplifying the consequences of challenged
legislative and executive actions). While Bickel’s writing only addresses constitutional
decision-making in the Supreme Court, the “concreteness requirement” now also applies
to non-constitutional litigation and to cases in lower federal courts. See Fletcher, supra
note 64, at 229. Bickel’s (and the Court’s) notion that a court would benefit from more
concrete adjudicative settings applies to lower courts as well as the high court.
87
See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (“The law of Art. III standing
is built on a single basic idea - the idea of separation of powers”); Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (standing confines courts to their “properly limited” role in
democratic society).
88

See Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellevue, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979) (standing
confines Court to a properly limited role in democratic society); Warth, 422 U.S. at 498
(same); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998) (resting
interpretation of Article III standing on separation of powers rather than text of article III).
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concrete adverseness remains part of the doctrine.89 Moreover, this
separation of powers rationale aims to explain why the Court reads article
III to require standing.90 Abstract separation of power principles have not
supplanted article III as the source of standing limitations.91 As a result, the
“concrete adverseness” rationale’s function of tying article III to standing
doctrine remains vital.
A separation of powers theory still requires an explanation of why
article III requires injury-in-fact based standing. Stating that standing
limits the Court to its proper role does not begin to explain what that proper
role is.92 A separation of powers approach requires a theory of what
precisely the role of the judiciary is.93 And a theory of standing must
explain why that role justifies a particular standing doctrine, such as the
requirement that litigants experience injury-in-fact.
The Court’s desire to avoid improper interference in the political
decisions of the executive and legislative branch does not explain injurybased standing any more than a simple statement that a court must remain
with its proper role. Every judicial order in public law interferes with one
of the other branches of government.94 The Court only issues such orders
when it concludes that another branch of government has violated the law.95
If that conclusion is correct and appropriate, then the interference is usually
proper.96 The Court has separate doctrines, the political question doctrine,

89

See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 11 (1998) (disclaiming sole reliance on
concrete adverseness as basis for standing).
90

See Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States, 529 U.S. 765, 771
(2000) (standing requirements are an essential part of “Article III’s case-or-controversy
requirement and a key factor in dividing the power of government between the courts and
the two political branches.”)
91
See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 102 n. 4 (reaffirming centrality of article III).
92
Cf. Nichol, supra note 50, at 1948 (accusing the Court of using separation of
powers as a label to accompany a decision not to hear a case, with no explanation as to why
it requires that result).
93
See Bandes, supra note 65, at 230-31, 263 (recognizing role of separation of
powers is only the beginning of an inquiry into the role of the federal judiciary). Accord
Scalia, supra note 57, at 894 (asking whether the doctrine of standing is “functionally
related to the distinctive role that we expect the courts to perform”).
94
Cf. Dorf, supra note 85, at 245-246 (any restriction on judicial power limits
interference with other branches of government).
95
See Pushaw, supra note 55, at 469 (federal courts inevitably “interfere” with
the majoritarian branches when these branches exceed constitutional bounds).
96

See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 350, 349 (1996) (courts must remedy official
interference with inmate’s presentation of claims to courts); Pushaw, supra note 55, at 484
(federal courts properly enforce executive branch duty to Take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed when they order compliance with a statute); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing
and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1471 (1988) (the “take care”
(continued...)
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and various doctrines of equitable discretion to prevent issuance of
improper orders, those that resolve political rather than legal questions or
unduly intrude upon the political process.97 The question of improper
interference properly focuses upon the merits, the political question
doctrine, and questions of equitable discretion, not upon injuries to
parties.98
The suggestion that standing avoids improper interference with
other branches of government functions as a tautology, not an explanation.
If one assumes that a proper judicial case requires injury, then one can say
that any case without an injury is an improper proceeding. The
characterization of such a case as an improper proceeding can then
plausibly support an inference that any order issuing from such a case is
improper. Since orders always interfere, the Court can link standing to
improper interference in this way. But this linking does not explain why
a proper judicial proceeding must have injury, it just assumes it to be true.
The view that separation of powers requires a contested case,99 as
I have explained above, does not justify the injury-in-fact requirement. The
Court’s discussion of concrete adverseness constitutes the Court’s only
explanation as to why a proper judicial role requires it to distinguish cases

96

(...continued)
clause does not authorize the executive branch to violate the law); Fallon, supra note 78,
at 14 (if Congress can exceed constitutional bounds without judicial check, then the written
constitution would not perform a restraining function).
97
See Pushaw, supra note 55, at 489 (suggesting the Court combine permissive
standing with use of the political question ground and ripeness doctrine to meet
“efficiency” concerns); Fallon, supra note 68, at 43-47 (suggesting that doctrines of
equitable discretion provides the proper restraint on remedies). See, e.g., O’Shea v.
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499-504 (1973) (discussing doctrines of equitable relief).
98
See Fallon, supra note 68, at 42 (injury requirement does not restrain judicial
overextension in the remedial phase); Kerry C. White, Note, Rule 24(A) Intervention of
Right: Why the Federal Courts Should Require Standing to Intervene, 36 LOY. L. A. L.
REV. 527, 554-555 (2002) (standing does not focus upon the “issues of the case”, but upon
the party and her injury); Tushnet, supra note 68, at 1700 (suggested that separation of
powers principles are better considered under the political question doctrine than under
standing doctrine). See, e.g., Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 814-821 (1973) (addressing
several claims regarding equitable discretion). Justice Scalia has argued that standing can
rule out adjudication of an issue in court if the court denies standing to all who might raise
it. See Scalia, supra note 57, at 892. This does not establish, however, that the interference
that judicial resolution of a legal issue would bring is an inappropriate as a matter of
separation of powers. To take the example Scalia used, separation of powers ought not
preclude enforcement of the establishment clause of the First Amendment. Cf. id. at 892
(suggesting that denial of standing in Flast would have eliminated judicial enforcement of
the establishment clause altogether).
99
See Neal Devins, Asking the Right Questions: How the Courts Honored
Separation of Powers by Reconsidering Miranda, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 251, 256 (2000)
(conservatives believe that separation of powers requires review only of issues “truly in
controversy and therefore represented by vigorous advocacy”).
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with injured plaintiffs from cases with other genuinely interested litigants
seeking a binding judgment. The lack of any other explanation for why
separation of powers justifies modern standing doctrine necessarily implies
that the desire for a “concrete” case must perform the key role of explaining
why article III requires injury-based standing.
While this article focuses primarily upon constitutional standing, the
Court applies prudential limits to standing as well.100 The doctrine of third
party standing allows the Court to avoid deciding cases where a litigant
seeks to invoke the rights of others to justify a remedy.101 Under the
Administrative Procedure Act,102 the Court only permits standing when the
plaintiff’s injury falls within the “zone of interest” arguably protected by
the statutory or constitutional provision under which relief is sought.103
And the Court sometimes declines to adjudicate cases based upon a
“generalized grievance” shared in substantially equal measure by all or a
large class of citizens.104 The Court has stated that these prudential limits,
like the constitutional limits, allow the Court to avoid deciding “abstract
questions of wide public significance.”105
Article III requires standing largely in order to assure sufficiently
concrete adjudication. Overly abstract matters may fall outside the bounds
of the case or controversy requirement.106
B. OTHER JUSTICIABILITY DOCTRINES
100

See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 11 (1992) (describing third party standing
as a “prudential” standing principle); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Gladstone, 441 U.S.
91, 99-100 (1979) (discussing prudential limits on standing); Fallon, supra note 68, at 18
(discussing limitations of generalized grievances and third party standing as prudential
limits) .
101
See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 193-197 (1976) (allowing beer vendor
to invoke the equal protection rights of young males in challenge to gender discrimination
in alcoholic beverage law); Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 11 (litigant who did not intend to travel
cannot invoke constitutional right to travel). Cf. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 407, 447-50
(1998) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (party may not assert third party’s rights unless an
obstacle prevents that party from asserting his own rights).
102
5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559; 701-706.
103
See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162-63 (1997).
104

See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); Federal Election Comm’n v.
Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998) (Court has found injury-in-fact when a grievance is
concrete, but widely shared): Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 581 (1992)
(Steven, J. concurring) (suggesting that the generalized grievance limitation remains
prudential by stating that it does not matter how many people suffer an injury). Cf. Warth,
422 U.S. at 501 (if Congress grants a right of action, a plaintiff may invoke the general
public interest in support of her claims); Defenders, 504 U.S. at 573-74 (plurality opinion)
(suggesting that the prohibition on generalized grievances is constitutional).
105
See Warth, 422 U.S. at 500.
106
See Dorf, supra note 85, at 247 (linking article III case or controversy
requirement to the interest in “concrete decisionmaking”).
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We have seen that the Court has suggested that Article III requires
litigants to satisfy its standing requirements, because of a need for concrete
litigation. Other justiciability doctrines also involve concreteness concerns.
1. RIPENESS
The Court sometimes dismisses cases otherwise properly before it
on ripeness grounds. The Court has remarked upon the close relationship
between standing and ripeness; ripeness dismissals often suggest that
standing does not exist now, but might exist later.107 A dismissal on
ripeness grounds, unlike a dismissal on standing grounds, usually suggests
that the Court will hear the case at a later date, once the facts are further
developed.108
The Court evaluates two factors in deciding whether a case is ripe
for judicial resolution.109 First, the Court evaluates the hardship delay
might visit upon the litigants.110 Second, the Court evaluates the “fitness
of the issues for judicial resolution.”111
The rationale for the ripeness doctrine places concreteness at center
stage.112 The Court has repeatedly explained that avoiding “premature
adjudication” prevents courts from “entangling themselves in abstract
disagreements.”113 Ripeness doctrine also protects agencies from “judicial
interference until an administrative decision” has “concrete” effects upon

107

See Warth, 422 U.S. at 499 n. 10 (“the standing question . . . bears a close
affinity to questions of ripeness”); Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation (NWF), 497 U.S.
871, 891-893 (1989) (finding challenge to land withdrawal program premature based on
grounds suggesting a lack of current injury). See, e.g., Presault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 11-12
(1989) (suggesting that takings claim may be ripe after the property owner making a
takings claim has taken advantage of relevant Tucker Act remedies).
108
See Pushaw, supra note 55, at 493 (“ripeness merely postpones a decision”).
See, e.g., NWF, 497 U.S. at 892-93 n. 3 (describing actions that will make rejected
challenge ripe); EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 72-73 n. 12 (1980)
(finding challenge ripe that previously had not been, because EPA “has now taken a
definitive position”).
109
See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967); Ohio Forestry
Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 733 (1998).
110
Gardner, 387 U.S. at 149.
111
Id.
112
See, e.g., Longshoremen v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 224 (1954) (describing
resolution of scope of legislation prior to its having an “adverse effect” in the “context of
a concrete case” as involving too “abstract an inquiry”).
113
Gardner, 387 U.S. at 148-149 (emphasis added. See Ohio Forestry Ass’n v.
Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 735 (1998) (“ripeness doctrine” gives great weight to avoiding
“premature review that may prove too abstract”); Sierra Club v. Peterson, 185 F.3d 349,
362 n. 16 (5th Cir. 1999) (describing the Supreme Court’s most recent ripeness case as
“‘standing for the proposition that abstract disagreements over administrative policies’ will
not make a controversy ripe”.)
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“the challenging parties.”114 Thus, the ripeness doctrine also reflects the
view that concrete injury makes cases concrete.
The ripeness jurisprudence, however, recognizes that concrete
injury does not aid merits analysis in some instances. The Court considers
cases presenting pure issues of statutory interpretation as fit for early
judicial decision, because they “would not benefit from further factual
development.”115 Thus, the Court recognizes that facts, such as facts about
injury, do not illuminate “pure” questions of statutory interpretation.116
Similarly, the Court recognizes that facial constitutional challenges do not
require facts making the litigation more concrete.117 It considers such cases
ripe even before the litigants experience the effects of the legislation at
issue.118 In both classes of cases, the Court seems to recognize something
that its standing jurisprudence tends to deny, that injury is quite irrelevant
to some kinds of merits analysis.
But the Court does consider factual development important to the
ripeness of as-applied-challenges - both statutory and constitutional.119 If
the litigant wishes to raise the question of whether a particular application
of a statute conflicts with the constitution or the question of whether a
particular application of a rule conflicts with a statute, the Court typically

114

Gardner, 387 U.S. at 148-49.

115

See Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns , 531 U.S. 457, 479 (2001).
See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581
(1985) (“further factual development” will not clarify this case’s “purely legal” issue);
Pacific Gas & Elec. v. Energy Resources Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 201 (1982) (finding
preemption question fit for judicial resolution because it is “predominantly legal”); EPA
v. National Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 72-73 n. 12 (1980) (finding challenge to
variances from water pollution control requirements ripe prior to the granting of a variance,
because EPA has taken a clear position on which factors are relevant to variances). Cf.
Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 301 (1998) (declining to adjudicate a request for
adjudication regarding the scope of a statute’s application facially, because it has not been
applied and the Court “lacks confidence” in its “powers of imagination” regarding how it
might be applied).
116

117

See, e.g., Presault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1989) (adjudicating claim that
Congress lacked authority under the Commerce Clause to enact the rails to trails program,
after finding takings claim “premature”).
118
See Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 736 n. 10
(1997) (facial challenges ripe the moment an ordinance is passed). See, e.g., Ruckelshaus
v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1000-1013 (1983) (adjudicating takings claim regarding
government disclosure of trade secrets, including claims about what government might
disclose in the future); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 527-532 (1992) (resolving
a facial takings claim, while declining to adjudicate as applied challenges)
119
See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 618 (2001) (explaining that
Court must know extent of permitted development to adjudicate a non-facial takings claim).
Cf. Dorf, supra note 85, at 294 (arguing that the distinction between facial and applied
challenges “may confuse more than it illuminates.”). Even if the distinction between facial
and applies challenges is confusing, it is the typology that the Court uses. Id.
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insists on some experience making the relevant scope of application
clear.120 In other words, it wants facts - sometimes including facts about
injury - to frame the issue for resolution.121 If the scope of application
remains subject to definition by future events, the Court labels the issue the
litigant seeks to raise abstract and often declines jurisdiction on ripeness
grounds.122
2. MOOTNESS AND CONCRETE REMEDIES
The Court also may decline jurisdiction when a party comes to court
too late, rather than too early. The Court considers the doctrine of
mootness closely related to standing, since a moot claim involves no
current injury and therefore offers no opportunity for judicial redress of an
injury.123
The mootness doctrine addresses the problem of abstract
remedial orders, rather than the problem of abstract holdings (i.e., holdings
not rooted in the concrete experience provided by the controversy). A
judicial order in a moot case might have no significant effect, since the
injury giving rise to the claim no longer exists.124 But since all of the facts
regarding the injury that had occurred remain available to the Court, a moot
case offers at least as rich a context for adjudication as non-moot cases.125
Indeed, because the Court permits standing based on likely future injuries,
a moot case, which arises after all relevant facts are fully known, usually

120

See, e.g., Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1019-20 (challenge to procedures offering
compensation for taking of a trade secret are not ripe, because “Monsanto’s ability to
obtain just compensation does not depend solely on the validity” of those procedures).
121

See, e.g., Williamson Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 190191, 199-200 (1984) (demanding application for and decisions about variances prior to
deciding a takings claim, because the court must evaluate the “economic impact” of the
challenged regulations to resolve the takings claim).
122
See, e.g., Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 313, 323 (1991) (labeling an unripe First
Amendment challenge to a prohibition on party endorsement of candidates abstract, when
the statute does not precisely define what endorsement means).
123
See Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environ. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 180 (2000)
(article III’s case or controversy requirement undergirds both mootness and ripeness);
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 68 n. 22 (1997) (referring to
mootness as standing set in a time frame). See also Bandes, supra note 65, at 228 (in
considering mootness, the Court emphasizes adverse parties and concrete claims).
124
See, e.g., County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979) (mootness
occurs when effects of violation have been eradicated and the violation will not recur).
125
See Monaghan, supra note 68, at 1384 (cases becoming moot on appeal present
a “concrete record illuminated by the adversary process”); Fallon, supra note 68, at 28-29
(past injuries continue to frame litigation in a factual context illuminating and limiting
judicial decisionmaking).
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offers more concreteness on the merits than a live controversy.126
Logically any judicial order that stops a defendant from doing
something that he would do absent the order appears concrete. The Court
sometimes uses the concept of an abstract case to refer to the problem of
issuing an order that does not change defendant’s conduct, because the
defendant does not intend to carry out the acts the order forbids.127 Such an
order is abstract and remedies only hypothetical misconduct.128 The
ripeness doctrine tends to avoid such orders by delaying adjudication until
the precise scope of a legal rule or action becomes clear enough to allow
the Court to avoid issuing hypothetical orders. The mootness doctrine also
avoids such orders by allowing defendant to escape application of an order
if it is clear that the misconduct has ceased and will not reoccur.129
But the Court sometimes recognizes that an order remedying
continuing misconduct may be appropriate, even after the opportunity to
redress the plaintiff’s injury has passed. For that reason, the Court has
carved out an exception to the mootness doctrine for alleged misconduct
capable of repetition yet evading review. 130 This exception would support
the idea that an order remedying misconduct can be concrete, even though
it does not remedy any specific injury before the Court.131
The availability of judicial review not remedying the injury of a
party before the Court suggests that Article III does not require injury-infact.132 But the Court’s standing jurisprudence emphatically denies that

126

Cf. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 191-92 (mootness may entail abandonment of a case
at an advanced state).
127
See, e.g., Davis, 440 U.S. at 632-633 (characterizing a decision about hiring
practices that have been abandoned as an “advisory opinion about abstract propositions of
law”). Cf. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 189 (case is only moot if defendant meets a heavy burden
of persuading a court that violations will not recur).
128

See, e.g., Davis, 440 U.S. at 632-633.
See, e.g., id. at 631-632 (state has stopped using invalidated civil service
exam). Cf. Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 810 (1973) (cessation of wrongful does not
moot a case if “there is a possibility of recurrence”).
130
See Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911); Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 602–03 (1982); United States v.
Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass’n, Inc., 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 125 (1973) (abortion rights can be adjudicated after women was no longer
pregnant, because women can become pregnant more than once).
131
See Monaghan, supra note 68, at 1384-1385 (mootness cases “confirm the
demise of the personal interest requirement”).
132
I am not the first scholar to question the notion that Article III requires injury
in fact. See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 68, at 1375 (injury in fact is not a “constitutional
prerequisite”); Bandes, supra note 65, at 245-50 (discussing the tension between the
mootness doctrine’s flexibility and the concrete adverseness requirement found in the
standing doctrine).
129
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idea.133
This article focuses upon abstraction and concreteness in resolution
of the merits, rather than in the content of remedial orders. But
completeness requires some attention to the concept of an abstract case as
a case generating abstract orders. And the doctrine allowing review of
cases involving continuing misconduct but no current injury casts doubt on
the hypothesis that the need to avoid hypothetical orders justifies the
injury-in-fact requirement at the heart of this article’s concerns.134
C. FORMALISM AND FUNCTIONALISM
Over time, the Court has tightened justiciability barriers designed
to make litigation more functional by providing concrete contexts for
judgment.135 Yet, most commentators agree that the modern Court has
become increasingly formalist in its approach to the merits of constitutional
cases.136
133

Cf. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 190-191 (recognizing that expansion of standing
doctrine could undermine exception to mootness doctrine for cases capable of repetition
but evading review).
134

A related problem involves choices about how defendants respond to holding
that their conduct is illegal. Some responses curing legal defects can remedy injuries,
while others may not. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 272 (1979) (state can respond
to holding that denial of a benefit is discriminatory either by extending benefit to the
excluded class or by denying benefit to all).
135
See Pushaw, supra note 55, at 496 (suggesting that Court has converted
ripeness doctrine from a discretionary doctrine to a constitutional barrier). See, e.g., Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (invalidating, for the first time, a
Congressional grant of standing and requiring a detailed showing of injury).
136
See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Getting Beyond Formalism in Constitutional
Law: Constitutional Theory Matters, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2001) (“the continuing allure
of formalism dominates constitutional law.”); Jack Goldsmith, The New Formalism in
United States Foreign Relations Law, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1395 (1999); Andrew S. Gold,
Formalism and State Sovereignty in Printz v. United States: Cooperation by Consent, 22
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 247, 247 (1998) (describing Printz as replacing functionalism
with “structural formalism” in the “state sovereignty context”) ; Evan H. Caminker, Printz,
State Sovereignty, and the Limits of Formalism, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 199, 200 (describing
the Court’s opinion in Printz as “decidedly formalistic”); Peter P. Swire, Note,
Incorporation of Independent Agencies into the Executive Branch, 94 YALE L. J. 1766,
1766 (1985) (the “new formalism” challenges the “functionalist approach”). Cf. Barry
Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67 U. CHI. L. REV.
1089, 1094 (2000) (characterizing the Court’s commerce and dormant commerce clause
jurisprudence as casting “aside” the “categories and methods” of “formalism” and
“realism”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. V.
Thornton, 109 HARV. L. REV. 78, 94 (detecting, in 1995, a trend toward functional analysis
in recent separation of powers cases in an article about dueling formalisms in the term
limits case). See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Relationships Between Formalism and
Functionalism in Separation of Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 21 (1998).
(continued...)
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A formalist approach emphasizes formal legal rules articulated at
a high level of abstraction to resolve cases.137 The Clinton case discussed
in this article’s introduction provides an example. While formalists often
claim that the text of legal documents (such as the constitution) creates the
rules they apply,138 formalist reasoning can sometimes create rules
noticeably at odds with text.139 The leading contemporary example of
formalist reasoning departing from text comes from the Court’s sovereign
immunity jurisprudence.140 The text of the 11th Amendment bars diversity
suites by a citizen of one state against another state in federal court.141 The
136

(...continued)
This does not mean that every decision of the Court falls into the formalist
category. No judge and no court are completely free of either functionalist or formalist
considerations. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, A Paradox Without a Principle: A Comment
on the Burger Court’s Jurisprudence in Separation of Powers Cases, 60 S. CAL. L. REV.
1083, 1087-88 (1987) (the Burger Court follows an “originalist” and “formalist”
methodology in cases testing the limits of Congressional power, while emphasizing
functional “policy considerations” in upholding presidential actions); Harold J. Krent,
Separating the Strands of Separation of Powers, 74 VA.L. REV. 1253, 1255 (1988) (the
Court has not adopted a uniform approach to separation of powers). Cf. E. Donald Elliott,
INS v. Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, The Constitution, and the Legislative
Veto, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 125-126 (discussing tension between “abstract formulas”
and consideration of “practical effects” in constitutional law).
137
See, e.g., KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING
APPEALS 5-6 (1960) (discussing the “formal style” of judicial reasoning prevalent in the late
nineteenth century); WILLIAM WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT:
LAW AND IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA, 1886-1937 (1998) (discussing the formalist style and
ideology of the “Lochner” period).
138

See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 136, at 132 (suggesting that the formalist
Chadha opinion incorrectly asserts that the framers defined legislative, executive and
judicial powers in the constitution).
139
See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992) (Tenth
Amendment limits on Congressional power are not derived from the amendment’s text).
140
See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (striking down
order that Florida negotiate with the Seminole Indian tribe under the Indian Gaming Act);
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educational Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527
U.S. 627 (1999) (invalidating federal abrogation of state immunity from private suit for
patent infringement); College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (invalidating federal abrogation of state immunity
from private suit for false and misleading advertising); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706
(1999) (invalidating enforcement of the Fair Labor Standards Act by a private individual
against his own state in state court); Kimel v. Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000)
(holding state immune from suit under Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Board of
Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (forbidding private
damage actions against the states under the Americans with Disabilities Act). See
generally Symposium: State Sovereign Immunity and the Eleventh Amendment, 75 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 817 (2000).
141
U.S. Const. Amend. 11. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54 (text of the 11th
Amendment “would appear” to restrict only federal court diversity jurisdiction). Cf. Hans
(continued...)
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text does not limit suits in state court or suits brought by a citizen against
her own state.142 Notwithstanding these textual limits, the Court has held
that the Constitution bars suits in state courts, and it does so even if the
plaintiff is a citizen of the defendant state.143
The formal legal rule from which the Court derives this result
simply states that states retain their sovereignty.144 The Court purports to
derive this state sovereignty rule from the structure and history of the
constitution, not from the text of the 11th Amendment.145 And the rule of
state sovereign immunity has been controversial among legal scholars.146
Nevertheless, the rule of state sovereign immunity stems from formalist
reasoning, which derives results from broad abstract principles.147
Functionalists tend to have a more pragmatic bent. They express
skepticism about the capacity of “general propositions” to decide “concrete
cases,” in the words of Justice Holmes.148 They believe that resolution of
cases involves some element of judgment in which an appreciation of the
consequences of rulings should play a prominent role.149
In the separation of powers area, Justice Jackson’s concurrence in
Youngstown Sheet and Tube v. Sawyer150 provides a paradigmatic example

141

(...continued)
v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (extending the amendment’s bar to suits by citizens of the
defendant state in federal court). See generally Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, The
Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L. J. 1 (1988) (exploring the
amendment and its interpretation prior to the recent development of still broader sovereign
immunity).
142
See U.S. Const. Amend. 11.
143
See Alden, 527 U.S. at 712.
144
See Alden, 527 U.S. at 713 (sovereign immunity is a fundamental attribute of
state sovereignty predating the constitution); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54 (each state is
sovereign and immunity from suit is an inherent part of sovereignty).
145

See Alden, 527 U.S. at 713 (declaring the term “11th Amendment” immunity
a “misnomer” because the immunity comes from history, structure, and precedent, not the
amendment’s text).
146
See, e.g., Symposium, supra note 140.
147
See Caminker, supra note 136, at 200-201. The sovereign immunity cases
employ the same sort of formalism that Caminker sees in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898 (1997). The sovereign immunity exhibits “doctrinal formalism” - a categorical rule
that does not admit of any case-by-case balancing. See Caminker, supra note 136, at 200.
They also employ “interpretive formalism”, in that “essential postulates” (i.e. state
sovereignty implies sovereign immunity) drive the reasoning. Id. at 201.
148
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
149
See Elliott, supra note 136, at 125-126 (discussing of tradition of considering
practical effects in resolving separation of powers issues); Holmes, Law in Science and
Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 462 (1899) (different rights rest on different policy
grounds).
150
343 U.S. 579, 634-655 (1952).
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of the functionalist approach151. Justice Black’s opinion for the majority152
exemplifies a formalist approach153.
In that case, the Court rejected President Truman’s seizure of steel
mills in support of the Korean war effort on separation of powers
grounds.154 Justice Black offered a formalist reason to reject the
Presidential seizure. Since Congress did not authorize the seizure, the
President could not carry it out.155 The President’s executive power did not
justify the seizure, because he did not execute any law passed by
Congress.156 Hence, the seizure violated separation of powers.
Justice Jackson provided a more functional and contextual rationale
for the same result.157 He offered a rather fluid framework for analysis,
under which Presidential power would be at its low ebb when Congress
seemed to disapprove of his actions.158 Because Congress rejected granting
the power to seize plants in debates about labor legislation, Justice Jackson
rejected the seizure.159 Justice Jackson suggested, however, that the case
might be stronger for Presidential authority if Congress were silent about
the matter before the Court, and would be quite strong if Congress
approved of his actions.160 Hence, Justice Jackson grounded his
functionalist opinion upon contextual constitutional judgment, whereas
Justice Black relied upon a categorical rule.
This tendency toward formalist merits adjudication raises questions
about justiciability doctrines that aim to provide context for adjudication.
For formalists may not need or benefit from context.161 Conversely, one
might argue that the justiciability doctrines raise questions about formalist
151
See Swire, supra note ?, at 1767-78 (identifying Jackson’s Youngstown
concurrence with a major shift to functionalism after 1935).
152
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582-89.
153
See Patricia L. Bellia, Executive Power in Youngstown’s Shadows, 19 CONST.
COMMENTARY 87, 88 (2002) (explaining that constitutional law textbooks use the majority
opinion as an example of formalist reasoning and the concurrences as examples of
functionalism).
154

Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582-89.
Id. at 585-89. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Products Co., 473 U.S.
568, 586-587 (1985) (identifying formalism with “reliance upon formal categories”); Cass
R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court 1995 Term Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110
HARV. L. REV. 4, 21 (1996) (reasons are by their nature abstractions).
156
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582-89.
157
Id. at 634-55 (concurring opinion).
158
Id. at 637.
155

159

Id. at 639 n. 8.
Id. at 635-37.
161
Cf. Elliott, supra note 136, at 147 (arguing that Court’s early decision in area
are often mechanical and rigid, but that subsequent decisions adjust to “new situations” it
confronts in the same area).
160
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merits adjudication that ignores context.
D. MODELS OF ABSTRACTION AND CONCRETENESS
While scholars and courts seem virtually unanimous in their stated
desire to avoid abstraction and embrace concreteness,162 neither defines
these concepts.163 A model, however, will help clarify common
understandings of concreteness.
Concreteness involves contextualized judgment. It often means that
facts influence results, not just theories.164 Facts tend to influence
judgments because they evoke a somewhat visceral response. This need
not mean that the decision-maker eschews thought.165 But it does mean that
shared intuitions about justice cause an emotional response to certain facts.
1. THE PRIVATE LAW MODEL
Trials before juries probably offer the best example of concrete
judgments. Juries deciding whether a defendant’s injury constitutes a
disability entitling him to compensation under a disability insurance policy
involves judgment about a specific set of facts. People have experience
with jobs.166 Their view of whether a particular ailment disables somebody
reflects a concrete judgment about whether the disability might make it
unduly difficult or impossible to perform a job.167

162

See, e.g., Babbitt v. United Farm Workers National Union, 442 U.S. 289, 297
(1979) (distinguishing between a case or controversy and “abstract questions.”); BICKEL,
supra note 10, at 111-198.
163

Cf. Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 297 (difference between an abstract question and a case
or controversy is not discernible by any precise test).
164
See Sunstein, supra note 155, at 20-21 (identifying concrete judgments with
minimal reasoning).
165
See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE
INTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONS (2001) (explaining that emotions reflect beliefs and values);
Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 269, 282-297 (1996) (same).
166
See, e.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 17 So.2d 879, 882-83 (Ct. App.
Alabama, 1943), rev’d on other grounds, 245 Ala. 247 (suggesting the jurors understand
the duties of a receptionist, so that expert opinion of a doctor should not have been
admitted). Cf. Conley v. Alleghany County, 200 A. 287, 293-94 (Pa. Super. 1938)
(disallowing expert testimony, because understanding of labor market for people with
obviously damaged organs is common knowledge).
167
See, e.g., Equitable Life Insurance Soc. of U.S. v. Davis, 164 So. 86, 89 (Ala.
1935) (doctor may not testify about capacity of laborer with loss of one arm to do work,
as this invades the province of the jury).

[05/06/03 draft]

STANDING FOR NOTHING

28

The case of Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Haworth,168 an early
forerunner of modern standing doctrine, shows that the Court accepts
something like the model of concreteness I have identified.169 In that case,
the Court upheld the Declaratory Judgment Act, finding the issue of an
insured’s disability sufficiently concrete to justify adjudication at the behest
of the insurance company (rather than the claimant).170
In private law litigation, resolution of the merits usually requires
some assessment of both the plaintiff’s and defendant’s experience.171 In
tort and contract, for example, the plaintiff must show injury and that
defendant breached a duty in order to recover more than nominal
damages.172 Thus, juries deciding these cases focus upon facts and
experience, for the most part.173
2. CONCRETENESS IN PUBLIC LAW
Judges and scholars see a range of abstraction in public law cases.
Such cases involve a mixture of formalist and functional elements.
Decisions heavily influenced by the litigants’ experience might
approximate jury trials in concreteness, whereas cases relying more upon
logical syllogism appear abstract.174
The Court suggests that facts clarifying the consequences of public
law decisions, framing the issues, and sharpening arguments make public
law decisions concrete. This idea of facts serving three functions seems
based on a private law model.175 In a jury trial on a disability, for example,
168

300 U.S. 227 (1937)
Cf. Fiss, supra note 33, at 37 (article III does not confine the court to a private
law dispute resolution model).
169

170

Aetna, 300 U.S. at 240-242.
See generally Fiss, supra note 33, at 17 (a private law model posits a judge
deciding which individual is right and which is wrong).
171

172

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965) (requiring invasion of an
interest, negligence, and causation to make out a negligence claim); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 346 (1981). See generally Fiss, supra note 33, at 22 (private
law model relies upon the concept of a “wrongdoer”).
173

See generally Daryl J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law,
111 YALE L. J. 1311, 1313 (tort adjudication focuses upon the “harm to plaintiff”).
174
See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 586-587
(1985) (linking abstraction to formalism and reliance upon formal categories and
contrasting abstraction with “practical attention to substance”).
175

Many scholars have noted the private law model’s influence on public law.
See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 78, at 20-23 (linking standing requirements to the private
rights “face” of Marbury v. Madison); Monaghan, supra note 68, at 1365-66 (tracing a
private rights model of public law to Marbury v. Madison); Fiss, supra note 33, at 17
(continued...)
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the facts would clarify the consequences of the decision, frame the issue,
and form the grist for the closing argument. Indeed, the typical jury
decision focuses largely upon how to characterize the experience of the
litigant. A jury might ask, for example, whether the back pain the litigant
experienced made it impossible to do a job. If the facts perform only one
or two of the three functions in a public law cases, then perhaps the case
becomes more concrete than a case like Clinton, where facts about the
litigants’ experience came close to being wholly irrelevant, but remains less
concrete than a typical jury trial in a private law case.176
One can see this model of concreteness (and abstraction) at work in
the famous debate about neutral principles. Herbert Wechsler criticized
Brown v. Board of Education’s177 principle that separate is inherently
unequal for it lack of neutrality.178 He argued that Supreme Court decisions
should rest upon abstract “neutral principles” that would apply to all cases
and make sense regardless of context.179 Many scholars, however, have
praised Brown as an appropriate response to the facts of desegregation.180
And they call for more judicial responsiveness to the experience of litigants
in public law cases.181
While scholars almost all claim to favor “concrete” cases,182 the
influence of Wechsler’s neutral principle idea should caution us to take this
claim with a grain of salt. For Wechsler’s idea seems to reject the kind of
contextualized judgment that the private law model suggests.183 Wechsler
175
(...continued)
(sketching a private dispute resolution model); Bandes, supra note 65, at 229 (acceptance
of the private rights model leads to a failure to address “collective rights and . . . harms”).
176
See Tushnet, supra note 68, at 1708 (defining abstract cases as those litigated
in the absence of good information about the actual operation of a challenged legal rule in
the real world).
177

347 U.S. 483 (1954)
See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1, 19, 31-35 (1959).
179
See id. at 19, (reasons must “in their neutrality and generality transcend any
immediate result involved.”).
180
See, e.g., Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709,
1750 (1993) (stating that Brown appropriately recognized that segregation subordinated
blacks).
181
See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech,
20 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L.REV. 1 (1985).
182
See generally Frederick Schauer, The Generality of Rights, 6 LEGAL THEORY
323, 324-328 (2000) (discussing strong support for the concept of concrete individual cases
among legal realists, and their distrust of abstraction).
183
Exposition of common law principles apart from jury trials may also involve
elements of abstraction. See, e.g., 3 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
ENGLAND 379 (judges must ascertain the true “axioms of law, which are general
(continued...)
178
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asks the Court to develop a general rule, which might be articulated at a
high level of abstraction.184 And he asks that Court to test that rule by
imagining how it might apply in future hypothetical cases not before the
Court.185
The simple model of a highly contextualized private law jury case
leads the Court to imagine that public law should enjoy at least some of the
concreteness this model suggests. The Court’s public law model of
concreteness, drawn from private law, envisions facts providing valuable
context that defines issues, leads to good clear arguments, and makes plain
the consequences of the decision the justices must make.
While the private rights model sketched above helps make sense of
the project of requiring “injury-in-fact”, rather than invasion of a legal
interest, to become the basis of standing, I do not claim that this model
exhausts possible understandings of concreteness and abstraction.186
Indeed, I have already pointed out that the case law also reflects a concept
of remedial concreteness, cases producing judicial orders that prevent real
actions, not just hypothetical ones. Other conceptions are possible as well.
But the conception I offer provides an adequate vehicle for exploring the
concreteness paradox and captures important elements of the Court’s
understanding of concreteness. In the next part, we examine whether the
application of standing doctrine has produced the sort of concreteness the
Court seeks for public law through its standing jurisprudence.
II. DOES THE INJURY REQUIREMENT MAKE ADJUDICATION OF THE MERITS
CONCRETE?
Most commentators say little about the Court’s view that the
standing requirement makes litigation more concrete.
The few
commentators who have said something about it disagree among
themselves. Alexander Bickel and Cass Sunstein, for example, make
conflicting claims, with Bickel claiming that standing makes litigation more

183

(...continued)
propositions, flowing from abstracted reason”).
184
See HERBERT WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 21
(1961) (insisting on grounds of “adequate generality”).
185
See ID. (principles in case must be “tested” by other applications that the
principles imply). Cf. Mark Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of
Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 809-10 (1983) (expressing
doubt about judicial capacity to imagine all future cases in which an announced principle
might apply).
186
See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 650 (1995)
(suggesting a very closely related ideal of concreteness, that of common law decisionmaking by judges); Bickel, supra note 66, at 53 (suggesting that for an absolutist, a bare
minimum of facts make a case concrete).
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concrete and Sunstein denying it.187 They both seem to take the correctness
of their views for granted, with little supporting analysis.188 Mark Tushnet
states that “it is entirely unclear that standing rules add anything to the
concreteness of the case.”189 While he provides analytical support for this
view, he does not systematically examine the relationship between injury
and the merits in a large sample of cases, as this article does.190
This part offers an extensive review of the case law to see whether
Bickel or Sunstein and Tushnet have the better argument. We shall see that
Sunstein and Tushnet’s view of standing as not contributing to concreteness
proves correct in most instances, but that Bickel’s contrary vision properly
characterizes some significant cases.

187

See BICKEL, supra note 10, at 115 (standing requirement tends to ensure that
cases get decided in a concrete context); Sunstein, supra note 96, at 1448 (“concreteness
or abstraction of the dispute” does not depend upon injury to the plaintiff).
188
Sunstein relies upon a single case, Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972),
to support this view and provides only conclusory analysis of that case. See Sunstein,
supra note 96, at 1448 (Court denied standing in Sierra Club v. Morton even though cases
was not “hypothetical or remote.”). He does not consider other cases that might support
or contradict his view. In fairness to Professor Sunstein, his remark on this point
constitutes a small part of a much larger argument. See id. at 1432-1434 (outlining a broad
thesis about the Court’s failure to embrace a public law model and the need to repudiate
Article III as a basis for standing requirements).
The cases Bickel mentions do not support his conclusion that standing
requirements make litigation more concrete. For example, Bickel explains that standing
did not exist in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936), but did exist in Tennessee Electric
Power Co., v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939). In both cases, petitioners sought to litigate
constitutional questions regarding Congressional authority to create the Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA). See Tennessee Electric, 306 U.S. at 135; Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 317,
319. The Ashwander plaintiffs, stockholders in the Alabama Power Corporation, which
had a contract with the TVA, experienced no injury, writes Bickel, while Tennessee
Electric Power Co. experienced an injury as a competitor. See BICKEL, supra note 10, at
119-121. But Bickel does not show that a competitor’s suit would create a more valuable
context for a decision about the TVA’s constitutionality than that of stockholders in a
company with which TVA had a contract. Both fact patterns would illustrate something
about the actualities of the TVA that the Court might consider in a case about the TVA’s
constitutionality. The contract giving rise to the Ashwander case directly related to the
TVA’s allegedly unconstitutional activities, creating and selling electric power. See
Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 315 (contract involved sale of transmission line and substations,
sale of TVA’s electric power, and agreements about the service area). Cf. Tennessee
Electric, 306 U.S. at 136 (sale of electricity gives rise to appellant’s claim). Indeed, the
concrete context that the Ashwander contract provided narrowed the issue under review,
notwithstanding the lack of injury to the petitioners. See Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 326
(issue defined in terms of the constitutionality of construction of the Wilson dam and the
sale of energy from that dam alone). Cf. Tennessee Electric, 306 U.S. at 136 (defining
issue as the constitutionality of federal sale of electricity, not just electricity from a single
dam, at wholesale rates).
189
See Tushnet, supra note 68, at 1714.
190
See id. at 1714-1716.
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A. CASES NOT EXPLICITLY LINKING INJURY TO THE MERITS
In three very important classes of cases, administrative law cases,
facial constitutional challenges based on individual rights, and structural
constitutional litigation, explicit linkages between injuries and merits
adjudication seldom arise. The requirement of injury-in-fact in such cases
usually does nothing to make litigation more concrete.
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES
In the leading contemporary standing case, Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife,191 the Court rejected a challenge to a rule refusing to apply the
consultation requirements of the Endangered Species Act of 1973192 to
projects overseas.193 The Court held that plaintiffs who had only indicated
a vague intention to visit the places whence endangered species might
vanish lacked injury-in-fact sufficient for standing, even though they had
visited these places in the past.194
Justice Steven’s concurrence, approving of standing, but ruling
against Defenders of Wildlife on the merits, clearly shows that injury would
not have “illuminated” the merits in any way.195 Justice Stevens explained
that Congressional intent governs the question of the Endangered Species
Act’s extraterritoriality. Accordingly, Justice Steven’s merits analysis
never mentions the injuries he found sufficient for standing.196 He rests his
analysis upon case law’s presumption against extraterritorial application of
a statute,197 the lack of explicit statutory language pointing overseas,198 the
position of implementing agencies,199 the statute’s structure,200 and its
general purpose201. Because the intent of Congress governed the question,
subsequent experience and injury to aggrieved parties, no matter how
concrete or dramatic, was quite irrelevant to the merits.
This disconnect between injury and merits does not come from
191

504 U.S. 555 (1992). See William W. Buzbee, Standing and the Statutory
Universe, 11 DUKE ENVT’L L. & POL’Y FORUM 247, 252 (2001) (characterizing Lujan as
the “base text” of modern standing law).
192
16 U.S.C. § 1531.
193

See Defenders, 504 U.S. at 557-58, 578.
See id. at 563-64, 579 (plurality and concurring opinions)
195
See id. at 585-589.
196
See id.
197
Id. at 585-86.
198
Id. at 586.
199
Id. at 587.
200
Id. at 588.
201
Id. at 588-89.
194
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some quirk in Justice Steven’s analysis. A majority of the Court employed
a similar approach with equally little reference to injury in EEOC v.
Arabian American Oil Co.202 In that case, an alleged victim of racial
discrimination by an ARAMCO subsidiary in Saudia Arabia, a person with
obvious standing, asked the Court to apply Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
abroad.203 The Court’s analysis in subsequent extraterritoriality cases,
some of which employ a less strong presumption against territoriality, make
equally little reference to injuries.204
The lack of linkage between the merits and standing in Lujan does
not stand alone. Rather, this pattern prevails in almost all cases litigating
the question of whether agency action conforms to a governing statute.205
Indeed, in the overwhelming majority of statutory administrative law cases
that come before the Court where standing is litigated, injuries have no
impact on the merits, and therefore no impact on the concreteness of the
merits litigation. I use the term “statutory administrative law cases” to refer
to cases where the principal claim is that an agency action conflicts with a
governing statute, as opposed to a claim that the agency’s reasons for its
exercise of discretion are arbitrary and capricious or not supported by
substantial evidence.206
202

499 U.S. 244 (1990)
See id. at 246-247.
204
On extraterritoriality generally, see Comment, Is That Your Final Answer?”
The Patchwork Jurisprudence Surrounding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality,
70 U. CINN. L. REV. 715 (2002).
203

205

See, e.g., Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 875-879 (1989)
(describing claim that land withdrawal review program violates the Federal Land Policy
Management Act and the National Environmental Policy Act); Friends of the Earth v.
Laidlaw Environmental Services, 528 U.S. 167, 176 (2000) (describing merits claim that
polluter exceeded permit limits, which does not require proof of harm to anyone); Bryant
v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352 (1979) (evaluating claim about the application of reclamation laws
to certain lands through statutory construction with no reference in the merits analysis to
the injuries of farmers bring suit); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 730 n. 2 (1972)
(describing legal claims about planned ski resort in the Mineral King Value that almost
surely would have been resolved with no reference to injuries). Cf. Andrus v. Allard, 444
U.S. 51, 55-64 (1979) (injury to plaintiff not considered, but the specifics of their actions
frame the statutory issue of whether the Secretary of Interior may bar the sale of parts of
birds killed before federal protections applied to the birds). Compare Akins v. Federal
Election Comm’n, 524 U.S. 11, 21 (1998) (injury conferring standing stems from inability
to obtain information that would help plaintiffs evaluate candidates for public office) with
Akins v. Federal Election Comm’n, 101 F.3d 731, 740-44 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc)
(merits analysis makes no reference to injury, focusing on interpretation of meaning of the
term political committee in statute in light of first amendment concerns with disclosure
statutes).
206
In practice, litigants and courts often combine these types of claims. See Arent
v. Shalala, 70 F.3d 610, 616 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1995). In principle, however, they are
somewhat separable. See id. at 616. Contrary to law claims assert that the agency actions
(continued...)
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The Supreme Court’s response to claims that agency action was
either arbitrary and capricious or not supported by substantial evidence uses
the agency record to provide the context for decision.207 Parties play a role
in creating this record through their comments and submissions. These
comments can document the parties’ potential injuries, but they often focus
more generally on the effects of an agency action on the public or its
interaction with pertinent public policies. Very often arbitrary and
capricious review does not directly address the injuries parties expect to
incur because of the challenged action.208 But sometimes facts about the
petitioner’s projected future injury frame issues for resolution.209
206

(...continued)
conflict with the statute. Arbitrary and capricious claims, by contrast, do not assert that the
substantive statutory provision governing the agency action at issue prohibits the particular
action taken, but rather suggest that the agency’s reasons for its decision were arbitrary and
capricious. Resolution of a contrary to law claim should, in theory, foreclose taking the
prohibited action. Resolution of an arbitrary and capricious claim, however, allows the
agency to take the same action again, if the agency provides a reasonable justification the
second time around.
These categories, however, tend to blend. See Arent, 70 F.3d at 616 (discussing
overlap between unreasonable statutory interpretation and arbitrary and capricious
decisions). See, e.g., Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 731 (1998)
(complaint alleged that Forest Service’s failure to properly identify lands economically
unsuitable for timber harvesting was contrary to both the authorizing statute and “arbitrary
and capricious”).
207
See Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167-169 (1962)
(review of agency action based on record before the agency, not “post-hoc”
rationalizations); Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 736-37 (1998)
(expressing view that review of site specific plans would offer more concrete context for
review than a plan for an entire national forest).
208
See, e.g., United States v. Fior Ditalia, 122 S. Ct. 2117, 2124-2125 (2002)
(resolving complaint about aggregation method’s tendency to overestimate a restaurants
FICA obligation for tip income, when restaurant did not claim injury from overestimation
in its case); Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378-385 (1989)
(dispute about necessity to prepare supplemental environmental impact statement hinges
upon importance of new information in a scientific study); Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Association v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, 463 U.S. 29, 46-57 (1983)
(insurance company challenge adjudicated in terms of agency rationale for rescinding
safety standard not impact on insurance company revenues); Fidelity Federal Savings and
Loan Ass’n v. Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 169-170 (1982) (upholding regulation authorizing due
on sale clauses in federal savings and loan association mortgage contracts with no
reference to potential injury to homeowners who must pay off mortgage all at once);
Federal Communications Commission v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting,
436 U.S. 775, 802-809 (1978) (FCC decision to grandfather in existing cross ownership
to prevent disruption of service upheld in challenge brought by primarily by broadcasters,
not the consumers who might experience disruption).
209
See, e.g., Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 113 (1992) (decision that EPA’s
issuance of discharge permit to an Arkansas polluter was not arbitrary and capricious; issue
framed in terms of relevance of further polluting an already degraded river). I was able to
(continued...)
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While agency adjudication and enforcement of rules does not
usually raise standing issues, the injuries in these cases do frequently make
merits adjudication concrete.210 But even in this context, policy issues arise
that make the direct experience of participants in agency adjudication
irrelevant to merits analysis.211
2. STRUCTURAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES
The line item veto cases exemplify a category of cases addressing
the structure of government. This category includes separation of powers
cases and federalism cases.212 The separation of powers cases address
questions regarding the limits of the powers of various branches of the
federal government.213 Federalism cases often address questions regarding
the limits of federal power imposed to preserve a sphere of state
sovereignty.214 In these cases, individual injury almost never significantly
influences the merits.215
209

(...continued)
find only one arbitrary capricious decision in which the Supreme Court decided an issue
of standing. Hence, my analysis infers the nature of injury from the party’s identity and the
nature of the challenged rule.
210
See, e.g., Baltimore & Ohio Railroad v. Aberdeen & Rockfish Railroad Co.,
393 U.S. 87 (1968) (information about cost structure of companies frames issues and
influences outcome of adjudication of challenge to rate-making); Adamo Wrecking
Company v. United States, 434 U.S. 275 (1978) (criminal charges against a company frame
issue as to whether Congress intended to apply criminal sanctions to violation of work
practice standards).
211
See, e.g., National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) v. Curtin Matheson
Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 812-818 (1990) (relying upon context provided by a range
of NLRB cases and general policies of National Labor Relations Act to uphold NLRB’s
refusal to presume that strike replacements oppose the union).
212

See MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN
RIGHTS, 37-38 (1982); Levinson, supra note 173, at 1367. See, e.g., New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (holding that Congress cannot compel states to dispose
of radioactive wastes); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (adjudicating
constitutionality of the line item veto).
213
See, e.g. Clinton, 524 U.S. 417 (adjudicating validity of executive power to use
a line item veto); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (adjudicating validity of exercise of
a one house veto); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (adjudicating validity
of judicial rulemaking regarding sentencing).
214
See New York, 505 U.S. at 156 (claiming that the states maintain a measure
of sovereignty in spite of broad Congressional powers); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995) (constitutional grant of authority to regulate interstate commerce does not allow
for federal restrictions on gun possession near schools); United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598, 607-19 (2000) (interstate commerce authority does not authorize creation of a
federal remedy for gender-based violence).
215
See, e.g., New York, 505 U.S. at 174-175 (holding that offering state a choice
(continued...)
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3. FACIAL INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS CASES
Facial challenges to statutes based upon individual rights claims
also rarely contain express links between injury and result.216 Litigants
making claims that the government has violated some provision of the bill
of rights often have a choice regarding how they frame the issue for
litigation.217 They may either argue that the statute challenged is
unconstitutional on its face or that it is unconstitutional as applied to the
plaintiff’s conduct.218 The Court tends to disfavor facial challenges.219
Indeed, the Court has often stated that litigants seeking declarations of
facial invalidity must show that no application of the statute conforms to
the constitution,220 although the Court has invalidated statutes facially in
many cases where the litigants have not made that showing221.

215

(...continued)
between taking title to low level radioactive waste and providing for disposal commandeers
state government); Clinton, 524 U.S. 417 (barely mentioning injuries of litigants before the
Court); Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361 (case hinges on history and text of constitution, not the
likely experience of criminals under sentencing guidelines).
216

See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Ass’n, 112 S. Ct. 1465, 1477-78 (2002) (explaining how a particular facial takings claim
eliminates the need to consider “the actual impact of the regulation on any individual”);
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 459-471 & n. 5 (1980) (particular type of picketing giving
rise to suit not important in analysis of whether the whole ordinance unconstitutionally
discriminates between different types of speech).
217
See Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 535 (1992).
218
See Richard H. Fallon, Commentary: As Applied Facial Challenges and Third
Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321 (2000). See, e.g., R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S.
377, 379-380 (1992) (teenagers accused of burning a cross on a black family’s yard mounts
a facial challenge to the ordinance under which they were charged); Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S.
Ct. at 1477-1476 (landowner making a takings claim seeks a categorical rule that any
moratorium on building constitutes a facial taking); Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536,
1550 (2003) (ban on cross burning with intent to intimidate is facially valid).
219

See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987); Suitum v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 736 n. 10 (1997) (facial challenges face an
“uphill battle,” since it is difficult to demonstrate that mere enactment of legislation
“deprived the owner of all economically viable use of the property.”). Facial challenges,
however, are more common than commonly recognized. See Dorf, supra note 85; Marc
E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule Requirement,
48 AM. U. L. REV. 359, 421-456 (1998) (Court’s openness to facial challenges varies with
the legal doctrine involved in the challenge).
220
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745; Reno v. Flores, 570 U.S. 292, 301 (1993); Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 183 (1991). Cf. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 n. 22
(1999) (characterizing the Salerno formulation as dictum).
221
See, e.g., Ada v. Guam Soc’y of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 506 U.S.
1011 (1992) (holding an anti-abortion statute facially invalid); Morales, 527 U.S. at 56-65
(holding an anti-loitering statute facially invalid); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
(continued...)
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Judicial opinions addressing facial challenges rarely focus upon the
influence of the challenged statute upon the plaintiff.222 Rather, they tend
toward abstract general reasoning.223 When they do consider concrete
situations, they often consider the situations of people other than the
plaintiffs.224
For example, in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,225 the Court
upheld the standing of arrested plaintiffs to litigate the question of whether
county post-arrest probable cause determinations were prompt enough to
satisfy Fourth Amendment requirements as a class action.226 One would
think that the question of whether a probable cause determination was
sufficiently prompt to satisfy a constitutional requirement about the
“reasonableness” of searches and seizures might invite narrow framing in
terms of the length of time plaintiffs actually remained in jail and the
reasons for lack of immediate determinations in the case before the Court.
The context the Court considered, however, comes not from the experience
of the named representatives of the class, but from a “County policy,” the
content of which is never resolved in the litigation.227 The Court does not
even state how long the named plaintiffs remained in jail awaiting a
probable cause determination.
In the end, the Court issued a ruling based on policy considerations.
The majority establishes a presumption that detention for longer than 48

221

(...continued)
Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (holding the Patent Remedy
Act invalid on sovereign immunity grounds). See also New York State Club Ass’n v. City
of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 11 (1988) (facial challenge may be permitted because of lack of
any valid application, or because statute reaches the plaintiff and its breadth inhibits third
parties’ speech).
222
See, e.g., Morales, 527 U.S. at 61-65 (striking down ordinance with no
reference to defendants’ experience except in footnote 34). Cf. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374, 387-391 (1978) (plaintiff’s injury considered along with hypothetical injury
others may experience from statute prohibiting marriage without payment of prior child
support, but heart of analysis focuses upon state’s justification for the burdens its statute
has placed on the right to marry).
223
See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 7-12 (1977) (decision to grant aliens
educational benefits rests upon analysis of level of scrutiny for alienage discrimination
under equal protection clause and policy considerations defining scope of a political
community).
224
See, e.g., id. at 6 n. 7, 11 n. 15 (considering total cost of providing educational
benefits for all aliens, not just for the plaintiff challenging the statute).
225
500 U.S. 44 (1990)
226
See id. at 50-52.
227
See id. at 48-49 (dispute exists about whether County policy requires probably
cause determination within 7 days or 10 days). The Court “assumed” that the ordinance
provided for a probable cause determination at arraignment, which implied a wait of no
more than seven days, for “present purposes.” Id. at 47-48.
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hours without a probable cause determination is invalid.228 It establishes
this period as presumptive, rather than mandatory, in order to implement a
policy of “flexibility” to accommodate varying state administrative
needs.229 Justice Scalia, relying more heavily upon historical understanding
of the Fourth Amendment, advocated a more stringent rule.230 None of the
Justices relied upon the concrete facts regarding the injuries to named
plaintiffs. As a consequence, it is not clear that the case offers relief (or a
denial of relief) to the named plaintiffs. The case, in many respects, uses
a vague hypothetical to announce a general rule, even though injured
plaintiffs brought the case.231
This tendency toward abstraction in facial challenges exists even
when the precise scope of injuries and the factual context they provide are
quite clear.232 For example, in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul233, the Court
adjudicated several teenagers’ claim that their arrest for burning a cross on
a black family’s yard violated their free speech rights.234 The merits
discussion, however, paid no attention at all to their conduct or their precise
injury. Rather, the Court focused on the question of whether the ordinance
under which they were charged, which outlawed fighting words based on
race, religion, or gender, constituted content discrimination.235 For the
cross burners wisely framed their case as a facial overbreadth challenge
under the First Amendment, rather than as a challenge to the statute’s
application to their awful conduct.236
At times, however, injury makes even rulings invalidating entire
statutes more concrete. For example, in Zablocki v. Redhail,237 the Court
invalidated a statute requiring parents with child support obligations to
meet that obligation in order to obtain a marriage license.238 Because the
applicant who brought the case was indigent and could not meet his child

228

See id. at 56-57.
Id. at 53 (citing need to encourage state flexibility and experimentation).
230
See id. at 60-70 (justifying a rule of probable cause determination within 24
hours absent extraordinary circumstances based on history).
231
This is not an isolated example. See, e.g., Gwaltney of Smithfield Ltd. v.
Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484 U.S. 49 (1987) (court decides issue of whether citizen
suits lie for “wholly past violation” in case where district court found that the defendant
remained in violation at the time of trial).
232
Cf. Fallon, supra note 68, at 14 (injury limits the scope of a judicial decision).
233
505 U.S. 377 (1992).
234
Id. at 379-380.
235
See id. at 380-391.
236
Cf. id. at 380, 396 (admitting that the conduct involved was punishable under
other laws and reprehensible).
237
434 U.S. 374 (1978).
238
Id. at 375, 390-391.
229
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support obligation, the Court analyzed the statute as a substantial
infringement upon the right to marry not well supported by the state’s
interest in collecting child support.239 Thus, an injury to a plaintiff can
make clear that a statute that might on its face appear only to burden a
right, can, in fact, wholly negate the right at issue. While injury often fails
to make facial challenges concrete, it sometimes concretizes rulings about
the validity of a statute when the Court uses the injury to examine the
statute’s practical implications.
B. AS APPLIED INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS CLAIMS SOMETIMES LINK
INJURY TO THE MERITS
Individual injuries sometimes influence resolution of as applied
individual rights claims. They often make as applied challenges somewhat
concrete in several ways. First, the nature of the plaintiff’s injury
frequently helps frame and limit the issue for resolution.240 Second, the
Court sometimes uses the facts regarding the litigant’s injury to illuminate
the consequences of the challenged government action.241 This in turn
informs the discussion of whether the Court should hold the government
conduct unconstitutional.
A good example of cases where this occurs involves allegations of
police misconduct violating individual constitutional rights.242 The Court
has sometimes denied standing to litigants who, in its view, failed to
adequately allege personal injury at the hands of the police.243 But judicial
239

Id. at 389 (statute broadly infringes right to marry, but fails to get child support
from those who have no money).
240
See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 821-822 (1975) (examining the
particular contents of an advertisement for abortion services to determine if the editor who
published it enjoys first amendment protection); Ruiz v. Hull, 957 P.2d 984, 998 (Ariz.
1998) (using experience of legislators challenging English only ballot initiative to illustrate
its First Amendment implications); Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 479 n. 14 (1987);
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 280 n. 14, 289 (1978)
(plurality opinion) (injury of inability to compete for all 100 places for medical school
leads to framing case in terms of “a line drawn on the basis of race.”); Andrus v. Allard,
444 U.S. 51, 64-68 (1979) (takings issue framed in terms of loss of opportunity to sell
artifacts of protected birds).
241
See, e.g., Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 229 & n.
4 (1987) (using the Arkansas Times’ situation as perhaps the only payor of a tax to show
that tax unconstitutionally singles out a small group within the press). Cf. Meese, 481 U.S.
at 488-490 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (objecting to court’s failure to use facts presented to
prove injury to evaluate effects of Foreign Agents Registration Act upon free speech).
242
See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 365-366 (1976) (discussing allegations
of police misconduct); Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 804-09 (1974) (same).
243
See, e.g., Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 371-73 (expressing doubt that injuries experienced
by the plaintiffs provided sufficient evidence of future harm); City of Los Angeles v.
(continued...)
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decisions on the merits in such cases do rely upon documentation of
plaintiffs’ injuries, at least in part, to establish a constitutional violation.244
In other cases, one might say that the injury conferring standing
frames the issue, because the case defines the injury in terms of the right
asserted, rather than the plaintiff’s concrete experience.245 In these cases,
however, we might just as accurately state that the legal claim defines the
injury that creates standing.246 This would suggest that the lawyer, not the
client’s experience, frames the issue. In such cases, plaintiffs with standing
arguably add no concreteness to the litigation. Plaintiffs without standing
framing the same legal issue would present equally concrete or abstract
cases.
Some of these cases involve two injuries, the invasion of a third
party’s right that the Court focuses upon, and a second more obvious
injury-in-fact that receives little discussion, since constitutional standing is
obvious.247 And this injury-in-fact creating constitutional standing figures
not at all in the merits analysis.248
Surprisingly often, facts about injury have no influence upon the

243
(...continued)
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (same).
244
See, e.g. Allee, 416 U.S. at 804-808 (discussing union members experience
with policy of harassment).
245
See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (injury may exist solely by
virtue of invasion of statutorily created rights). See, e.g., Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474,
476-478 (1990) (alleged invasion of white litigant’s right to a fair cross section of the
community creates standing to challenge constitutionality of peremptory challenges to
strike prospective black jurors); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410-417 (1991) (convicted
white defendant’s standing to challenge striking of black jurors rests on the right a
proceeding that appears fair); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 277, 291 n. 8 (1987) (standing
to challenge disparate sentencing based on the victim’s race is based on claim that state
violates equal protection); New York State Club Association v. City of New York, 487
U.S. 1, 8-10 (1988) (private club’s standing to challenge municipal prohibition based on
its “associational rights”).
246
See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, slip op. at 13 (2003) (in an equal protection case,
denial of equal treatment constitutes injury, so that a showing of denial of a benefit is not
required)
247
See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company, 500 U.S. 614, 629 (1991)
(party asserting rights of third parties must suffer a concrete injury of her own). See, e.g.,
Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 432-33 (1998) (plurality opinion) (Court evaluates
discrimination against plaintiff’s father and statute’s impact on the plaintiff); Powers, 499
U.S. at 428 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (suggesting that the injury creating constitutional
standing for a white defendant to challenge striking of black jurors stems from the
punishment meted out upon conviction).
248
Cf. Miller, 523 U.S. at 451 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (denial of third party
standing would change the substantive standard governing the merits, because injury to the
plaintiff only triggers rational basis scrutiny).
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merits at all in as-applied individual rights cases.249 For example, in Renne
v. Geary,250 the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to California’s
restriction of endorsements in non-partisan elections on standing and
ripeness grounds.251 The majority explained how awaiting a challenge by
different litigants might add context to the case, showing “the nature of the
endorsement, how it would be publicized, [and] . . . the precise language”
used.252 It did not, however, explain how any of these details would
influence the merits of the First Amendment challenge.253 Justice White’s
dissent, in fact, proposed a resolution of this “as applied” first amendment
issue that rested upon assessment of the state’s interest and public forum
analysis, not the facts that the majority felt it needed to make the case
justiciable.254 A subsequent lower court case also demonstrates the
irrelevance of the context the Renne majority found so important, by
employing an analysis similar to Justice White’s.255 And the Supreme
Court itself resolved a similar issue - whether the state may prevent
candidates for elected judgeships from announcing their views on political
and legal questions - without reference to any specific censored statements

249

See, e.g., Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583 (1972) (majority finds
no injury to a political party challenging an oath requirement, but dissent would find a
constitutional violation because ordinance on its face discriminated against all minor
political parties); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13-24 (1972) (majority and dissenting
opinions) (majority finds no concrete injury from alleged army surveillance, but dissent
would resolve case on the basis of the lack of direct legal authority for surveillance);
Babbitt v. United Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 312-314 (1979) (finding Arizona’s union
election procedures constitutional, because compulsory collective bargaining is not a
constitutional right); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 166, 171-79 (1972)
(injury involves denial of service to guest of a private club, but merits adjudication focuses
upon state action question); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (pre-enforcement
challenge to campaign financing law with almost no reference to the litigants’ actual
situation).
250
501 U.S. 312 (1991).
251
See id. at 316-324.
252
See id. at 322.
253
Accord id. at 341 (Marshall J., dissenting). Marshall also points out that “the
form of the future disobedience can only matter in ripeness analysis to the extent that it
bears on the merits of a plaintiff’s pre-enforcement challenge.” Id.
254
See id. at 328, 332-334 (White J. dissenting). Cf. id. at 343-349 (Marshall J.,
dissenting) (proposing a resolution of the case based on facial overbreadth). Justice White
defined the issue as whether the deletion of candidate endorsements from voters’ pamphlets
violated the First Amendment. See id. at 328-330. He found that it did not, because the
voter pamphlet is not a public forum and the state’s interest in “impartial” government,
“prevention of corruption, and avoidance of the appearance of bias” sufficiently justified
the restriction. See id. at 333.
255
See California Democratic Party v. Lungren, 919 F. Supp. 1397, 1400-1405
(N.D. Cal. 1996) (striking down the restriction, because it serves no compelling state
interest).
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in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White.256
Third party standing cases cast doubt on the hypothesis that injured
litigants make cases more concrete than as-applied challenges predicated
upon the injuries of others. For they show that litigants may make cases
more concrete by bringing in facts about how challenged practices injure
people other than the litigant.257 For example, defendants seeking to
challenge search and seizures predicated upon violations of others’
expectations of privacy have used the facts pertaining to those searches, the
facts leading to injury to a third party’s privacy rights, to make litigation
more concrete.258
For example, Jack Payner challenged the validity of a search that
uncovered a document that helped prove that he falsified his income tax

256

536 U.S. 765 (2002) (Minnesota rule prohibiting judicial candidates from
announcing their views on disputed legal and political issues violates First Amendment).
The White dissenters claimed that the Court’s “entire analysis has a hypothetical quality”
stemming from the Court’s inability to rely upon specific statements from the candidate to
make the litigation more concrete. Id. at ___ (Stevens, J. dissenting). In fact, however, the
Court relies upon injuries that were not part of the case before it to make the case more
concrete. The plaintiff claimed that the rule under review forced him to refrain from
announcing his views on legal and policy issues in a 1998 campaign for judicial office. Id.
at ___. But the injury incurred in 1998 could not create concrete context for litigation of
the sort sought in Geary, because the plaintiff declined to specify what statements he
wished to make in the 1998 campaign. Id. at ____. The Court, however, created some
concrete context by referring to the subjects the plaintiff addressed during a prior campaign
for judicial office in 1996. The plaintiff probably did not base his complaint on the events
of 1996, because The Minnesota Lawyers Responsibility Professional Responsibility Board
dismissed an ethics complaint against him under the challenged rule, which might create
an argument regarding mootness. Arguably the real injury in 1998 produced no factual
context and the non-injury in 1996 did create useful context. Cf. id. at ___
(notwithstanding dismissal of ethics complaint in 1996, candidate withdrew from election
out of fear of additional complaints). In many other cases, however, nothing about the
plaintiff’s concrete experience influences the merits. See infra n. 249
257
See Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392, 400 (1998) (white defendant would
be an effective advocate for excluded black grand jurors).
258
See, e.g., United States v. Padilla, 580 U.S. 77, 80-81 (1993) (conspirator has
no standing to seek exclusion of evidence seized in violation of co-conspirator’s
expectation of privacy); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980) (repudiating
automatic standing for criminal defendants to challenge seizure of evidence relied upon by
the prosecutor); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104-106 (1979) (defendant has no
standing to challenge seizure of drugs he placed in another person’s purse, since he had no
reasonable expectation of privacy to assert); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731-32
(1980) (refusing a defendant standing to contest unconstitutional seizure of documents
from somebody else). This rule, while clearly announced in Salvucci, has antecedents in
earlier cases. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-140 (1978) (Court may not
exclude evidence under the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule unless it was seized in
violation of the defendant’s own constitutional rights).

[05/06/03 draft]

STANDING FOR NOTHING

43

return in United States v. Payner.259 The record, presumably developed by
Payner’s lawyers, made this allegation quite concrete. It showed that IRS
agents had stolen the briefcase of a banker to obtain a key document,
without obtaining a warrant.260 Indeed, a district court judge found that the
government counsels its agents to deliberately violate the Fourth
Amendment rights of innocents in order to obtain the goods on a suspect.261
The Supreme Court used this record and characterization to frame the issue
in the case as whether a “federal court should use its supervisory powers to
suppress evidence tainted by gross illegalities that did not infringe the
defendant’s constitutional rights.”262 It begins its analysis with a concrete
allusion to the specific facts, stating that “No court should condone . . . this
briefcase caper.”263 But the Court concluded that the importance of
“ascertaining the truth in a criminal case” counseled against allowing
litigants to assert other’s Fourth Amendment rights, even in this context.264
Payner illustrates that lawyers can develop facts about other people’s
situations to make litigation more concrete.265 This implies that even
without in injured client, litigation can become concrete through the
development of context.266 Of course, Payner’s lawyer had a motivation to
seek out this information, since his client faced real jeopardy. But an
ideological plaintiff’s desire to win her case would likewise motivate her
to seek out concrete facts to help bolster her case.267 So, Payner does
support the more general lesson that non-injured parties, if represented by
good lawyers, can develop factual information making a case concrete.268

259

See 447 U.S. at 728-729.
See id. at 729-730.
261
See id. at 730.
262
See id. at 733. All of the courts involved agreed that Payner had no protectable
privacy interest in the documents taken from the banker’s briefcase. Id. at 732.
260

263

Id. at 733 [internal quotations omitted].
Id. at 734-35.
265
Examples of this can be multiplied. See, e.g., California Democratic Party v.
Lungren, 919 F. Supp. 1397,1399, 1403 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (discussing evidence from
County Supervisor election in a case arising from injury incurred in a school superintendent
election).
266
See, e.g. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 281-82 (1979) (decision about whether
alimony statute violates equal protection made more concrete through application of
information about nature of alimony proceeding available through case law).
267
See Tushnet, supra note 68, at 1708-1709, 1713 (suggesting that ideological
plaintiffs with a sufficient interest in the subject matter often will be capable of generating
an adequate record for decision).
268
See FRCP 26(b),(c); 30(a)(1);31(a)(1); 34(c); 35(a) (authorizing discovery
against non-parties). See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, slip op. at 15-21 (2003) (affirming the
importance of context to equal protection analysis, and then going on to examine a record
(continued...)
264
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In other types of individual rights litigation as well, injuries to people other
than the plaintiffs can make litigation concrete.269 In general, as applied
constitutional litigation involves some cases where individual injury does
make litigation more concrete, but others where it does not.270
C. IMPLICIT LINKAGE
The lack of explicit consideration of facts regarding the alleged
injury in the merits portions of an opinion provides evidence that those
facts did not make that case more concrete. But this lack of explicit
consideration does not rule out the possibility of implicit use of the facts
regarding injury to improve the concreteness of judicial decision-making.
Even when the merits portion of an opinion does not mention the plaintiff’s
injuries, those injuries might have silently shaped the case - providing facts
that strengthened influential arguments in the briefs not explicitly
mentioned in the opinion or elucidating consequences that motivated the
decision. We must consider the likelihood and probable implications of
this possibility.
If injury silently shaped cases where it had no explicit influence,
this would raise significant issues. Silent influence would suggest that the
judge writing the decision has not been wholly candid in revealing the
grounds for the decision. Indeed, functionalists often suspect judges of
precisely that, and argue that increasing candor would solve the problem.271
But this silent influence would have other slightly less obvious implications
as well.
The failure to mention the relevance of injury to the merits decision
would often influence its precedential scope. For example, let us imagine
that the Justices invalidated the line item veto in Clinton because they were
concerned about declining medical care in New York hospitals that lost
federal funding through President Clinton’s veto. This might suggest that
a veto of, say, line items for highway construction might pass muster. But
268

(...continued)
built by parties and amici that went far beyond the particulars of race relations and student
performance at the University of Michigan).
269
See, e.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 57 (1992) (allowing state to
assert injury to excluded jurors). Cf. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 433-34 (1998)
(plurality opinion) (experience of a hypothetical female central to Court’s evaluation of an
equal protection claim alleging discrimination against males).
270
Cf. Fiss, supra note 33, at 18 (in public law, the focus of judicial inquiry is
upon a “social condition,” not discrete events). See also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env.
Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72-94 (1977) (injury discussed in merits analysis is different
then the injury forming the basis for standing).
271
See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 136, at 145 (suggesting that the Court’s formalist
opinion in Chadha drives policy judgments “underground” and arguing for open and above
board conclusions about the legislative veto’s effects).
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the Court has no reasoning limiting its holding to veto of medicare funding,
so this argument should not fly. The reasons given, not the silent
motivation of judges, control the precedential scope of the decision. And
the reasons given in Clinton rule out all line item vetoes.
The wisdom and validity of the Clinton decision must rest on an
assessment of the constitutional soundness of an order ruling out all line
item vetoes. Thus, if concrete context is desirable because it aids sound
judgment, as Bickel argues, it failed in this case. If the judgment is sound,
it is for reasons having little to do with the injuries to New York hospitals.
1. IMPLICIT FRAMING
The problem of implicit framing has been addressed in the analysis
regarding explicit linkages above. For the analysis considers any framing
of issues that in fact corresponds to the scope of an injury that helped
justify standing as an example of explicit linkage. That analysis did not
confine itself to cases where the Court explicitly said, “We use the injury
to frame the question before us.”
But the frequent lack of correspondence between injury and the
framing arising in many cases calls attention to some fundamental issues
that need analysis. Injuries do not frame litigation, lawyers and judges
do.272 Ultimately, the Court determines how to define the issue it addresses
in its opinion.273 Lawyers seek to frame issues in a manner helpful to their
case, and to convince the Court to adopt that framework.274 The possibility
of facial challenges to statutes shows that litigants need not confine their
challenges to those applications that only injure them.275 Even injured

272

See Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 535-536 (1992) (lawyers may
frame the issue upon which they wish to seek certiorari, but the Court may rephrase the
question); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (some justices framing the challenge
facially and some framing it as an as applied case). Professor Isserles argues that a court’s
choice about the scope of appropriate invalidation is “predetermined at the outset.” See
Isserles, supra note 219, at 452. But it is not clear that this statement should be taken
literally. For he argues that an integral connection exists between doctrinal tests and
decisions about how much of a statute ought to be preserved. Id. This suggests that a
Court’s view about how much of a statute to preserve might influence doctrinal tests. In
any case, so many cases involve disputes between justices about how an issue should be
framed (as in Troxel, supra) that a claim of predetermination seems at best exaggerated,
and Isserles himself qualifies it. See id. at 452-53.
273
See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, 1983 DUKE L. J. 789, 791 (suggesting that the Court
could have, and should have, decided Chadha on narrower grounds).
274
See, e.g., id. at 792 (suggesting that none of the lawyers found narrow framing
of the issues in Chadha in their clients’ interest); Levinson, supra note 173, at 1314-1315
(discussing how two lawyers arguing a takings claim would frame the issue differently).
275

Cf. Tushnet, supra note 68, at 1712 (Hohfeldian plaintiffs can induce courts to
make abstract decisions binding future courts and litigants).
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litigants can make ideological choices about what issues to raise. And
judges can employ discretion to decide how to frame issues as well.276
Lawyers’ propensity to frame issues to advantage their clients does
not imply that the wise lawyer will always seek a ruling confined to the
context that the client’s injury provides. A quite broad ruling will
encompass the client’s injury as well as a narrow one.277 And sometimes
a wide framing of an issue can help the client.278 In Clinton, a good
argument existed that all line items were invalid. It would be very hard to
construct an argument narrowly targeting at veto of funding for New York
hospitals. Furthermore, ideological clients who have experienced injury
may prefer broad frames to get at the problem that is really bugging them.
And repeat players may seek rulings not only addressing their injuries, but
all conceivable problems that might arise in the future. Injury’s influence
on framing does not always confine.
2. CONSEQUENCES
It is impossible to know whether injuries grounding standing
influence the merits when the Court does not mention them in its merits
analysis. The Clinton case would suggest, however, that this may occur
less frequently than many functionalists might suspect. After all, the
justices deciding Clinton probably did not care about the hospital’s loss of
funds. It’s hard to imagine that the case would have gone the other way
if no worthy beneficiary of pork barrel spending came before the Court. It
seems quite likely that the Court shared the public’s concern about pork
barrel spending, exemplified in the Clinton case by the farmers’
cooperative’s tax breaks, but simply found the line item veto inconsistent
with the clauses governing legislation in the constitution.
Just as lawyers and judges control framing they also control
introduction and use of facts as well. Lawyers with injured clients may
place facts regarding these injuries in the record and use those facts to try
276

See, e.g., Yee, 503 U.S. at 535-536 (acknowledging that the Court has “on
occasion rephrased the question presented” or asked the parties to address an issue not
raised, and going on to construe the issue before them more narrowly than the petitioner
had). Strauss, supra note 273, at 791 (suggesting that the Court could have, and should
have, decided Chadha on narrower grounds); Levinson, supra note 173, 1332-1375
(discussing how judicial views about the appropriate framing of a transaction influence
constitutional decisions).
277
See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291 (1987) (black defendant
claims that Georgia capital punishment statute violates equal protection, because death
penalty applied more often to black defendants and murders of blacks than to white
defendants and murders of whites)
278
See, e.g., R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 379-380 (1992) (teenagers who
burned a cross on a black family’s lawn facially attack the hate speech ordinance under
which they are charged).
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and win sympathy. But lawyers with concretely injured clients can choose
to argue abstractly about the constitutional questions, and in cases like
Clinton they probably will. Even when lawyers choose to bring up the
consequences of the laws or regulations they wish to challenge, they need
not confine themselves to the injuries their clients experience.279 They can,
and often do, discuss the ramifications for other people or even society as
a whole. And judges can decide whether the client’s context, a broader
context, or no context aids wise decision-making.280 So an injured client
offers no guarantee that facts will illuminate the consequences of judicial
decisions or influence the arguments of lawyers. In fact, injured clients
cannot guarantee concrete merits litigation.
This raises an interesting normative questions. Part III will address
the question of whether the facts giving rise to injury should influence the
Court’s decisions, and what the Court should do about the possibility of
value flowing from such influence.
D. THE STRUCTURE OF LINKAGE
The evidence we have suggests a structure to the pattern of linkage
between injury and the merits. Structural constitutional cases, significant
administrative law cases, and facial challenges predicated upon individual
rights rarely become concrete because of a litigant’s injury. By contrast,
as applied individual rights challenges more often use individual injury as
a concretizing device. The explanations for this pattern do much to
illuminate the structure of public law and the theoretical consequences of
the paradox.
III. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
This part explains why injuries giving rise to standing have so little
impact upon most merits analysis and assesses the broader implications of
this failure of standing requirements to improve the concreteness of
litigation. It analyzes the nature of public law and its structure to help
explain the paradox of standing having so little influence on the merits.281

279

See generally Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (court’s judgment
may benefit others collaterally).
280
See Tushnet, supra note 68, at 1723 (jurisdictional doctrine will not prevent
Court from formulating a broad abstract rule if it wants to). See, e.g., Thomas v. Union
Carbide Agric. Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 590-591 (1985) (considering context of
experiences frustrating realization of statutory purposes of the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act in adjudicating challenge to arbitration provisions under
Article III of the Constitution).
281
See generally Fiss, supra note 33, at 2 (arguing that judges deciding
(continued...)
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It then develops the normative implications of this paradox.
A. THE NATURE OF PUBLIC LAW
Little doubt exists that a formalist approach to merits adjudication
tends toward abstraction. It does not follow that the formalist approach
constitutes the only or even the most important reason for injury’s failure
to produce widespread concreteness in public law litigation. We must
carefully examine the nature of public law to see if the tendency to ignore
injuries really comes solely from formalist reasoning style.
Typically public law cases become much more abstract than jury
trials. Marbury v. Madison282 describes judicial review as an exercise in
resolving a conflict of law claim, laying the constitution alongside an Act
of Congress to see whether the statute runs afoul of the constitution.283
Marbury appeared quite abstract to contemporaries steeped in the norms of
the common law. President Jefferson, while not an objective observer,
complained about the abstractness of Marbury.284 But some degree of
abstraction is inherent in determining whether two laws conflict, especially
if one or both are phrased in broad terms.285 And it is inherent in any legal
problem requiring construction of broadly worded grants of power.
We law professors may find this point more difficult to appreciate
than our students do. Because we are quite used to legal analysis based on
logical arguments about whether two propositions set out in legal
documents conflict, such arguments appear more concrete to us then they
might to first year law students, a jury, or even many trial judges. But this
mode of analysis is inherently more abstract than the type of contextualized
judgment found in a jury trial.286
In the public law context, details about the plaintiff’s experience
that would lend context to private law adjudication can become irrelevant
to merits analysis. The Marbury v. Madison Court adjudicated the question
of whether Secretary of State Madison breached a legal duty to make

281

(...continued)
constitutional individual rights cases give meaning to public values)
282
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
283
See id. at 177-178 (describing deciding which of two conflicting laws govern
a case as the “essence of judicial duty”).
284
See Jefferson to Justice William Johnson, June 12, 1823, 1 S. CAR. HIS. &
GEN.MAG. 1, 9-10 (1900) (referring to Marshall’s “obiter dissertation” in Marbury).
285
Cf. Pushaw, supra note 55, at 500 (suggesting that a “lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards” exists in many constitutional clauses).
286

See Schauer, supra note 186, at 658 (“reason giving is the kin of abstraction”
and checks “maximum contextualization” and “case by case determinations”).
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Marbury a Justice of the Peace.287 The Court did not discuss any details
about how much the loss of this commission meant to Marbury, as it might
of had the loss of a commission constituted some kind of tort giving rise to
damages dependent upon the extent of injury.288 Instead, the Court devoted
most of its attention to the question of whether it had authority to adjudicate
Marbury’s claim289 and also concluded that Madison had breached a duty
to Marbury290. The context that details about Marbury’s suffering might
have provided became irrelevant.
Something like the Marbury model of constitutional litigation
applies to a large class of administrative law claims as well. Many litigants
claim that an agency action, often the promulgation of a rule, conflicts with
a governing statute.291 Such a claim requires a Court to set the statute
alongside the agency decision to see whether the two conflict. So, claims
that an agency action are contrary to law tend toward Marbury type
abstraction.
The predominance of conflict of law questions in public law often
makes injuries to litigants irrelevant to the resolution of the merits.292 In
conflict of laws cases, textual analysis matters. The intention of the framers
of the trumping document - the constitution in constitutional cases, the
statute in administrative cases - matters. But injuries to litigants may not
matter. They will matter only to the degree that the Court cares about the
consequences of decisions for the litigants.
Conflict of law claims form the backbone of public law. They
encompass the broadest constitutional and statutory rulings.293 Claims that

287
288

See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 153-162.
Cf. id. at 164 (loss of office of trust, honor, or profit involves injury, not just

loss).
289

See id. at 163-180.
Id. at 162 (withholding of Marbury’s commission is “not warranted by law, but
violative of vested right.”).
290

291

See, e.g., Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 462-471, 476184 (2001) (resolving claim that EPA’s rule establishing new National Ambient Air
Quality Standards conflicted with the Clean Air Act); TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 172
(1977) (resolving claim that construction of Tellico Dam would violate the endangered
species act).
292
I use the term “conflict of laws” here in a general sense to describe any claim
that two laws conflict. I do not mean to use the term in a narrow sense common in the legal
profession, as referring only to the question of which jurisdiction’s law applies in an
interstate case.
293
See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (invalidating legislative veto in
numerous statutes as violating the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and
presentment); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (greatly limiting campaign finance
limitations as in conflict with free speech guarantee in the First Amendment); American
Trucking, 531 U.S. at 464-71 (EPA may not consider cost in promulgating national
(continued...)
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an agency action or Congressional statute conflict with a trumping
document require interpretation of the trumping document. Since both the
constitution and statutes govern not just the case before the Court, but a
range of future cases, these rulings tend to define public values.294 And
they necessarily have consequences for non-litigants, not just the litigants
before the Court.295 As a result, they draw the Court’s attention away from
the litigants before them into questions of interpretation and of the broader
implications of the ruling.296
Typically cases become more abstract as they move up the appellate
ladder. Again, we law professors may be uniquely poorly qualified to see
this, since we live in the world of appellate cases. But an appeal of
sufficient merit to generate an opinion typically abstracts a single issue or
a small number of issues from the contextual soup of trial. And a
successful petition for certiorari usually tears a single issue (or a very small
group of issues) from the context of trial and even intermediate appellate
review.297 The petition becomes an exercise in characterizing the issue and
the holdings of other circuits in such a way that a circuit conflict appears.298
Alternatively, a certiorari petition can emphasizes the importance of the
issue, not to the litigant, but to the nation as a whole.299 And the Supreme

293

(...continued)
ambient air quality standards under the Clean Air Act).
294
Cf. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, ___ (2002)
(American adjudication cannot be completely separated from the enterprise of
representative government because judges make common law and interpret constitutions).
295

See Pushaw, supra note 55, at 479 (the Marbury Court recognized that its
decisions had ramifications going far beyond Marbury’s injury); Lujan v. National Wildlife
Federation (NWF), 497 U.S. 871, 891 (1989) (some statutes permit broad regulations and
authorize judicial review before “concrete effects” are felt); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972) (invalidating death penalty statutes in a number of states). See also NWF, 497
U.S. at 913 (Blackmun J. dissenting) (if the plaintiff prevails in a challenge to a rule of
broad applicability the court will invalidate the rule, not simply its application to a
“particular individual”).
296

See Thomas v. Union Carbide, 473 U.S. 568, 593 (1985) (vague statute draw
meaning from statute’s purpose, factual background, and statutory context)
297
See Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 536 (1992) (discussing how certiorari
practice forces litigants to choose the most important issues from the many presented
below).
298
See Sup. Ct. R. 10 (1999) (listing conflicting decisions as grounds for
certiorari).
299

See Sunstein, supra note 155, at 16 (practice of granting certiorari for cases of
national importance assures that the decision will “affect other cases”); Fallon, supra note
78, at 23 (court chooses issues which need its attention in light of public interest in clarity
and uniformity of the law). See also Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some
Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1714(continued...)
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Court issues pronouncements at such a high level of abstraction300 that its
decisions often fail to even resolve the case before the Court, instead
causing a remand where lower courts can figure out whether a general
principle enunciated by the Court should influence the outcome of the
case.301
A simple model of abstraction and concreteness would suggest an
inherent concreteness to private law trials and inherent abstraction in public
law litigation, especially at the Supreme Court level.302 This begins to
explain why insistence upon injury does not often produce concrete
litigation. But it does not explain why relatively concrete adjudication
occurs in some cases, but not others.
B.

THE STRUCTURE OF PUBLIC LAW

Some simple insights into the structure of public law help explain
the patterns of concreteness and abstraction described in part II. The
structure of legal problems, rather than the existence of injury, determines
whether injury to plaintiffs makes the litigation more concrete. And
elucidating this structure helps explain the observed pattern.
1. THE ADLER-FALLON DEBATE
The explanation which follows sheds light upon and expands a
recent debate regarding the nature and structure of constitutional law.303
Mathew Adler argues that constitutional law is about the validity of legal
299

(...continued)
1715 (2000) (describing tension between certiorari practice and the private rights model of
adjudication).
300

See Fallon, supra note 78, at (Court routinely issues “broad pronouncements,
not rulings tailored to the case before it.”).
301
See, e.g., County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 59 (1990)
(remanding after announcing a general presumption regarding the length of appropriate
pre-arraignment detention); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 632 (2001)
(remanding case because it has not resolved question of whether a takings has occurred or
not); Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 524 U.S. 156, 172 (1998) (holding that
interest on client trust fund accounts constitutes private property of the client and
remanding to resolve underlying takings claim). Cf. Brown v. Legal Foundation of
Washington, 538 U.S. ___ (2003) (resolving issue left open in Phillips).
302
See Scalia, supra note 57, at 896 (claiming that judges are “instructed to be
governed by a body of knowledge that values abstract principles above concrete results.”).
303

Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American
Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1998) [hereinafter, Adler, Structure]; Matthew D.
Adler, Personal Rights and Rule-Dependence: Can the Two Co-Exist, 6 LEGAL THEORY
337 (2000) [hereinafter, Adler, Coexistence]; Fallon, supra note 218; Matthew D. Adler,
Rights, Rules, and the Structure of Constitutional Litigation: A Response to Professor
Fallon, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1371 (2000) [Adler, Response].
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rules, not about the rights of individuals to take certain actions.304 He takes
as his point of departure an individual rights case, Texas v. Johnson,305
which invalidated a prohibition upon flag burning.306 He asks whether we
should understand this case as protecting the act of flag burning or as
prohibiting the law against desecrating the flag.307 He argues that since flag
burning leading to a conflagration could still be outlawed as arson, we
should understand this individual rights case as about the validity of legal
rules - specifically, the flag desecration statute.308 Texas v. Johnson does
not, argues Adler, insulate the act of flag burning from legal consequences.
Hence, this case does not protect the individual from injury (in the form of
arrest for flag burning). By implication, constitutional law does not protect
certain individual actions; it invalidates improper legal rules. This insight
leads Adler to the startling conclusion that “there is no such thing as an as
applied constitutional challenge.”309
Richard H. Fallon challenged this statement, arguing that as-applied
challenges remain the norm.310 He also questioned the notion that all
constitutional challenges should be understood as rights against rules.311
For my purposes, the points of consensus that emerged from this
debate matter more than the differences. First, both Fallon and Adler agree
that many, although not all, individual rights cases are properly, and
importantly, understood as cases about the validity of legal rules.312
Second, they agree that some constitutional challenges invalidate only
some applications of a rule, instead of all of them.313 This latter agreement

304

Adler, Structure, supra note 303, at 3.
491 U.S. 397 (1989).
306
See Adler, Structure, supra note 303, at 3-7.
307
See id. at 3.
308
See id. at 3-5 (claiming that Johnson could be prosecuted for arson or other
general offenses connected with flag burning, but not for violating the flag desecration
statute).
309
See id. at 157.
310
See Fallon, supra note 218, at 1368 (as-applied challenges remain the . . .
primary mode of constitutional attack).
311
See id. at 1364-68.
312
See id. at 1325 (accepting Adler’s “important insight” that many . . .
constitutional rights are rights against rules.”); Adler, Response, supra note 303, at 1374-75
(Fallon is “absolutely correct” that some types of rights challenges do not “entail the
existence of a particular type of rule”). See also Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G.
Sager, Religious Liberty and the Moral Structure of Constitutional Rights, 6 LEGAL
THEORY 253, 257 (2000) (appreciation of the extent to which Adler’s view is correct can
provide “important insight into the moral structure of constitutional rights.”).
313
See Fallon, supra note 218, 1334-1335 (articulating an understanding of asapplied challenges as invalidating “subrules” while leaving other subrules in tact); Adler,
(continued...)
305
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lies concealed behind varying definitions of “as-applied” challenges.314
Third, they agree that the results of Supreme Court litigation typically bind,
at least indirectly through the doctrine of precedent, parties not before the
Court.315
The insights gleaned from this debate form the beginnings of a
structural account of public law adequate to illuminate the paradox. Yet,
to do this the concept of litigation about the validity of legal rules needs
more elaboration.
On the surface, the idea that constitutional law should be understood
as about the validity of legal rules, rather than about individual rights would
seem to have a fatal flaw. The Court requires personal injury before it will
adjudicate a case and it often says that constitutional rights are individual
rights.316 In this sense, at least, constitutional law is not about the validity
of legal rules. But one should understand Adler’s claim as a descriptive
claim about the content of merits adjudication.317 This descriptive claim

313

(...continued)
Response, supra note 303, at 1387 (distinguishing between complete and partial repeal of
a rule).
314
See, e.g., Adler, Response, supra note 303, at 1387 n. 56 (stating that “asapplied” challenges vindicating personal rights of claimants do not exist, but “as applied
challenges” partially invalidating rules do exist).
315
See Fallon, supra note 218, at 1362 (an invalid rule cannot be enforced against
any party); Adler, Response, supra note 303, at 1412 (a Supreme Court order invalidating
rules can oblige officials not to enforce against anyone). See generally Geoffrey Hazard,
The Supreme Court as a Legislature, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1978).
316
See Rebecca L. Brown, When Political Questions Affect Individual Rights: The
Other Nixon v. United States, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 153 (the law of standing reflects the
view that judicial capital should be expended to vindicate individual rights); Nichol, supra
note ?, at 1920 (describing protection of private rights as the “trigger of judicial power”);
Fallon, supra note 78, at 22 (principle that court should only adjudicate constitutional
questions to protect the rights of individuals finds “abundant expression” in post-Marbury
judicial opinions); Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre
Districts,” and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances after Shaw v.
Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 513 (1993) (“In much of constitutional law, both substantive
and procedural doctrines require that harms be individuated”).
317
This is the correct reading of Professor Adler’s article for two reasons. First,
Professor Adler sees himself as addressing “the moral content of constitutional rights,” see
Adler, Structures, supra note 52, at 2, which suggests a focus upon merits adjudication.
Second, second Adler defines standing as “extrinsic” to his central claim. See id. at 122.
To be sure, Adler discusses the tension between article III and his concept of constitutional
law as adjudication of the validity of legal rules. See id. at 132-145. But he does this to
rebut possible institutional objections to his theory. See id. at 132. Adler does claim that
his account of the structure of moral constitutional rights should influence standing
doctrine, id. at 153, because courts should construe article III in ways that comport with
the structure of constitutional rights, id. at 140. This article, in part, begins working out the
implications of some of Adler’s insights for our conception of adjudication and hence for
standing doctrine.
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raises the normative issue this article explores - why should injury matter
so much to justiciability, when it plays no role in many merits decisions.318
Furthermore, the concept needs extension beyond the individual
rights cases that Adler and Fallon focus on. Public law includes not just
individual rights claims, but structural claims about the distribution of
power and non-constitutional claims about the validity of agency actions
under governing statutes. Professor Fallon argues that constitutional law
rarely conforms to simple characterizations of the whole, but to varying
structures based on the legal doctrines at issue.319 The following analysis
applies this insight to extend understanding of public law beyond the
individual rights cases by discuss how structures vary across areas of public
law.
2. STRUCTURAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Structural cases often involve facial claims about entire statutory
provisions, if not entire statutes. The statutory provisions under attack tend
to have broad and uncertain substantive impacts, since they only specify
procedures not outcomes.320 Their impacts upon individuals tend to be
largely incidental, the result of the substantive decisions that the actors
empowered to make the decision took. One can rarely know whether
relocating power to a different branch or level of government would
obviate or exacerbate the particular injuries that might motivate a litigant
to sue.
It hardly seems surprising that the pattern found in the Line Item
Veto cases is rather typical of structural constitutional cases. The standing
inquiry seems utterly ritualistic and the litigants tend to vanish from view
as the Court debates great issues of structure. The litigants’ injuries
typically contribute little or nothing to the concreteness, or any other aspect
of the litigation. For separation of powers and federalism aim to protect
institutions. To be sure, this protection of institutions from each other aims
to advance the welfare and liberty of the individuals who created the
318
Cf. id. at 153 (noting that Adler’s theory has implications for doctrine
governing “the proper parties” to litigate rules challenges). Commentators have been
intrigued by Adler’s argument, but some have been skeptical about its doctrinal value. See,
e.g., Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 312, at 254 (expressing skepticism about the theory’s
value in constructing free exercise jurisprudence).
319
See Fallon, supra note 218, at 1327 (constitutional doctrines are too diverse to
conform to “any elegant unifying theory”). He is, of course, not alone in offering this
insight. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, The Heterogeneity of Rights, 6 LEGAL THEORY 269,
270 (2000) (“constitutional rights are heterogeneous, and properly so”)
320
See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (invalidating legislative vetoes);
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (invalidating line item veto); Mistretta
v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (validating judicial rulemaking in the area of criminal
law).
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government.321 But any particular choice of institutional arrangement will
effect an individual indirectly and unpredictably, making it hard to separate
the effects of institutional arrangements from those of substantive political
decisions that might occur irrespective of institutional structure.322
3. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
Individual rights claims, by contrast, involve claims that the actions
of government officials transgress constitutional limits enacted to protect
individuals from government. Since individual rights often aim to protect
individuals directly, rather than institutions, the Court sometimes considers
the impact upon individuals relevant to decisions in this area.323
Yet, as Professor Adler points out, even in this area, legal rules are
often (but not always) at stake. Legal rules impact many people.324 Hence,
the Court often turns away from consideration of the impacts upon the
individual before it, especially if the lawyers or the judges choose to frame
the litigation broadly, for example, as a facial challenge. In this area,
however, the experience of litigants often bears some relationship to the
assessment of merits. So, at least in the case of as applied challenges, the
experience of litigants sometimes plays a role in making the litigation more
concrete.
Examination of the relationship between merits adjudication and
injuries justifying standing, however, helps clarify the structure of
individual rights litigation. Some legal tests make the degree of injury
relevant to resolution of an individual rights claim. Examples include
takings claims, which depend on the degree of economic harm the plaintiff
experiences, and procedural due process, which requires assessment of the

321

See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (“[T]he Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty.
. .”).
322

See PERRY, supra note 212, at 53 (“it is most unlikely that the Court” could
specify how resolution of a separation of powers challenge would affect individual
freedom); Dorf, supra note 85, at 246 (while structural provisions secure liberty in the long
run, they may not do so in any every case); Thomas v. Union Carbide, 473 U.S. 568, 579580 (1985) (defining relegation of claim to a non-Article III forum as an injury different
from any particular monetary loss that hypothetically could flow from adjudication in the
wrong forum). See generally Nichol, supra note 50, at 1938 (application of standing to
federalism and separation of powers cases has “seriously eroded” the claim that
“constitutional review”only protects “private rights”).
323
See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 312, at 258 (some constitutional claims may
focus primarily upon the claimant’s immediate circumstances).
324
See Schauer, supra note 186, at 655 (suggesting that an opinion supported by
fairly general reasoning offers an advisory opinion respecting cases not yet before the
court); Tushnet, supra note 68, at 1711 (“absent parties often benefit when a litigant”
convinces “a court to adopt a new legal rule”).
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weightiness of the plaintiff’s interest and the risk of error in a particular
proceeding.325 In such cases, injury often makes cases more concrete.
While such cases can establish a plaintiff’s right to be free of a rule, they
often require such context specific analysis that they may leave general
questions about a rule’s validity quite open and have limited impacts upon
subsequent cases.
Other legal tests, however, focus upon defendant’s conduct or other
factors and make individual experience rather irrelevant. And the Court
has tended to gravitate increasingly toward these tests. Thus, for example,
the Court has moved away from a test that often exempted religious
exercise from generally applicable rules, a test which uses injury as a
framing device, to a test that often accepts neutral general rules, even if
they impinge on free exercise incidentally.326 This formalist doctrinal
change means that the general intent of the rule’s framers will matter much
more than individual injury in resolving merits.327 This move converts a
personal right to engage in a practice to a right against rules aimed at
discouraging religious practice.328 And it tends to convert as applied
challenges to something more like a facial challenge.329 Resolution of such
a facial claim can easily invalidate an entire statute.330
4. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The most significant administrative law cases involve claims that
an agency action violated a governing statute. Such claims require a
comparison of the agency’s action to Congressional intent. Injury typically

325

See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 341-347 (1976) (establishing the
degree of deprivation of a right, liberty or property interest, the risk of error in a
proceeding, and the cost of providing additional procedures as factors to be considered in
a procedural due process challenge); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1019 (1992) (deprivation of all economically viable use of a property constitutes a
taking); Penn Central Transportation Corp. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)
(making the economic impact on the plaintiff a relevant factor in an ad hoc factual inquiry
governing takings claims).
326
See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-890 (1990) (generally
allowing neutral rules to infringe free exercise); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215
(1972) (holding that state must exempt Yoder from a statute’s application to protect his free
exercise of religion).
327
See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Haleah, 508 U.S. 520,
533 (1993) (a post-Smith challenge to the statute, rather than its application); Isserles,
supra note 219, at 435 n. 340.
328
See Adler, Coexistence, supra note 303, at 342.
329
See Haleah, 508 U.S. at 534-535 (Court examines text of ordinance and the
context of its passage to determine whether it has a discriminatory purpose).
330

See Haleah, 508 U.S. at 533 (lack of facial neutrality toward religion is grounds
for invalidation).
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plays no role at all in resolving the merits of such disputes. Narrower
claims that an agency exercised its discretion arbitrarily or without
substantial evidentiary support usually do not implicate injury either.
These sorts of claims typically involve assessment of the quality of agency
reasoning with injury becoming wholly irrelevant or peripheral. To the
extent that the case focuses upon agency responses to comments about a
party’s injury, injury might help frame issues. One would expect such
comments to often make administrative adjudication more concrete, but to
play this role less often in more broadly significant rulemaking, where the
parties may rely on hypothetical rather than real injury to test the logic of
agency rulemaking.
5. PROBLEMS ON THE BORDER
In cases along the conceptual border between individual rights and
structural litigation, the insistence upon personal injury contributes nothing
to resolution of the merits. Perhaps the law regarding redistricting offers
the most striking example. In this area, the Court seeks to employ an
individual rights framework, rooted in the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, to decide upon the structure of government,
through review of redistricting decisions.331 Redistricting, according the
Court, can injure individuals by stigmatizing them on account of race or
depriving their votes of impact.332 The Court generally allows voters to
challenge the constitutionality of their districts, but denies standing to
voters whose challenge seems rooted in complaints about neighboring
districts.333 Yet, redistricting affects groups and usually does not aim at any
individual voter.334 Because the lines influence the structure of

331

See Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 593, 607-608 (2002) (describing how the Warren Court framed “framed federal
constitutional oversight of the political process in the . . .language of individual rights.”).
332

See John Hart Ely, Commentary: Standing to Challenge Pro-Minority
Gerrymanders, 111 HARV. L. REV. 576, 577-78, 586, 594 (1997) (reduction of influence
white people experience in becoming part of a new district where blacks have enough votes
to elect a black representative constitutes injury). In this area, some scholars have found
the concept of injury itself extremely abstract. See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 316, at 506516 (arguing that the Court’s rejection of oddly shaped electoral districts shaped to enhance
minority voting strength inflicts an “expressive harm”).
333
See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 957-958 (1996) (allowing resident of allegedly
gerrymandered district to challenge its constitutionality); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 904
(1996) (generally only voters of challenged district have standing); United States v. Hays,
515 U.S. 737, 739 (1995) (denying standing to voter outside of gerrymandered district);
Sinkfield v. Kelley, 531 U.S. 606 (2001) (denying standing to voter whose challenge
primarily aimed at unconstitutionality of neighboring district).
334
See Issacharoff, supra note, 331, at 606 (describing how a conception of equal
(continued...)
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government, (who gets to elect whom), linking individual harms to the
redistricting decision seems difficult.335
The individual experience of injury that the Court envisions
becomes completely irrelevant to analysis of the merits in this area.336
When the Court reaches the merits it focuses upon questions about
legislative motive, geography, political boundaries, demography, and
transportation corridors.337 Surely a requirement of individual injury does
nothing to improve the concreteness of these abstract cases.338
C. SHOULD INJURY INFLUENCE PUBLIC LAW OUTCOMES?
For a formalist, injuries to litigants in conflict of laws cases should
not matter. In its most extreme form, formalism cares not a jot about the
consequences of legal decisions, for litigants or anybody else. Rather,
formalist judges often believe that the answers to public law questions
come from pure textual exegesis.339 When they do not believe that, they
often believe that the intention of the framers of the Constitution provides
the correct answers to the questions before them.
Several of the Justices on the formalist Rehnquist Court have
expressed an unwillingness to let the experience of litigants influence their
judgments, especially through the medium of intuitions about justice. They
often expressly repudiate a contextual model of adjudication.
A good example comes from Justice Scalia’s statements regarding
the unprincipled nature of rulings relying upon a judge’s sense of fairness.
For example, in Burnham v. Superior Court,340 Justice Scalia rejected
judicial judgment about fairness as a touchstone for due process limits upon
personal jurisdiction in a case accepting transient jurisdiction - jurisdiction

334
(...continued)
protection in terms limited to individual rights produced a failure to outlaw “categorical
denial of registration” to all black voters in Alabama in Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475
(1903)).
335
See Issacharoff, supra note 331, at 608-609 (“an individual rights approach”
fails to capture the “constitutional insult”).
336
See, e.g., Bush, 517 U.S. at 959-983.
337

See, e.g., id.; Pildes & Niemi, supra note 316, at 527-586 (discussing
methodology for addressing geographic “compactness” concerns).
338
See Issacharoff, supra note 331, 596 (linking early reapportionment cases to
“a somewhat abstract right to” full and effective participation). Issacharoff goes on to
describe a major component of merits analysis in this area as “indeterminate to the point
of incoherence.” Id. at 635.
339
See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Youngstown Goes to War, 19 CONST.
COMMENTARY 215, 225 (2002) (calling Black’s majority opinion in Youngstown “a
masterpiece of textual and formal analysis”).
340
495 U.S. 604 (1990).
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through the service of process upon somebody just temporarily with the
forum state.341 Scalia disapproved of the notion that judges’ concrete
response to the facts of the case before them should influence their
judgments regarding due process.342 Instead, he called for reliance upon
formal rules derived from history.343
A more functional view of the role of judicial review might suggest
a greater need to take injury into account.344 But perhaps not.
A functional view involves taking context into account. But that
does not establish that injury to litigants before the Court provides
important or even relevant context, even for a functionalist.345 Indeed,
Professor Bickel, who so forcefully advocated justiciability criteria as a
way of making cases more concrete, admonishes judges not to “do in each
case what seems just for it alone.”346
Consider Justice Jackson’s functionalist approach in Youngstown.
Justice Jackson’s analysis depends upon context, but not a personal injury
context.347 Rather, the relevant context involves the context of
Congressional policy expressions about the matter at hand.348 The injuries
the steel makers might incur through Presidential seizure played no role in
his opinion.349
341

Id. at 623-27 (plurality opinion).
Id.
343
Id. at 621-22.
342

344

See Fiss, supra note 33, at 12 (suggesting that response to concrete facts might
produce a true account of constitutional values).
345
Cf. Elliott, supra note 136, at 150-156 (suggesting that the systemic effects of
the legislative veto provide the correct context for considering its constitutionality from a
functionalist perspective); Brown, supra note ?, at 126 (distinguishing consequences
“involving separation of powers” from those “related to individual rights”).
346

See BICKEL, supra note 10, at 55. Bickel links this argument to an endorsement
of the idea of neutral principles and the embrace of Kant’s categorical imperative. See ID.
Bickel understands that his arguments about justiciability as limiting the Court to a
concrete context are in tension with the ideas of neutral principles. He writes, “The
function of judicial review arises in the limiting context of cases, to be sure; but while the
Court should not surmount the limitation, it must rise above the case.” ID. at 50. Bickel
does not explain how the context of cases limits judicial review if the Court “rise[s] above
the case.”
347

See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-55 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring)
348
See id. See also Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Products Co., 473 U.S. 568,
593 (1985) (discussing role of statutory context, rather than individual context). Cf.
Monaghan, supra note 68, at 1372-73 (constitutional questions can turn on “legislative
facts,” such as “facts bearing on matters of economic or social organization”).
349
See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 584-85 (passing over takings claim to address
issue of whether President had authority to issue the seizure order); J. Gregory Sidak, The
Price of Experience: The Constitution After September 11, 2001, 19 CONST. COMMENTARY
(continued...)
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Nevertheless, it would be myopic to suggest that injuries to litigants
never influence judges, even in public law cases. But the more important
question for a functionalist judge would be the normative one. Should
injuries to an individual litigant influence results in a public law case?
The adage that hard cases make bad law350 raises some questions
about the value of having litigants’ injuries influence the outcome of cases.
A hard case often refers to a case where instincts about justice collide with
the requirements of formal rules.351 This can occur, for example, when a
case presents an unusual fact pattern.352 Because the designers of the rules
may have created it with typical cases in mind, application of a perfectly
good rule to an abnormal fact pattern can create unjust results.353 A hard
case can produce bad law, because the Court will often modify the law to
bring about a just result under an unusual fact pattern making
straightforward application of the rule unjust.354 In so doing, the court may

349

(...continued)
37, 44 (2002) (the Youngstown Court “blew past” the takings issue the steel mill owners
presented to reach the separation of powers issue). Similarly, Justice White’s functionalist
dissent in the Court’s Tenth Amendment opinion in New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144 (1992) relied upon the context of state participation in federal law making, rather than
individual injury to create relevant context. See New York, 505 U.S. at 189-194
(describing the enactment of the statute before the Court as federal adoption of a politically
negotiated compromise between states).
350
See, e.g., N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904) (Holmes
J., dissenting). Although Justice Holmes is credited with this famous adage, it was first
introduced to the American courts by Justice Harlan. See United States v. Clark, 96 U.S.
37, 49 (1877) (Harlan J., dissenting) (quoting Lord Campbell that “it is the duty of all
courts of justice to take care, for the general good of the community, that hard cases do not
make bad law”) (citing East India Company v. Paul, 13 Eng. Rep. 811, 821 (P.C. 1849));
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Hard Cases and the (D)Evolution of Constitutional Doctrine, 30
CONN. L. REV. 961, 966, n.15 (1998) (explaining the origins of the adage).
351
See Phillip J. Closius, Rejecting the Fruits of Action: The Regeneration of the
Waste Land’s Legal System, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 127, 127 (1995) (stating that
“sympathetic fact patterns” are a “judicial nightmare” because of the tension between
societal values and the need to follow legal precedent).
352
See, e.g., Andrew R. Klein, A Legislative Alternative to “No Cause” Liability
in Blood Products Litigation, 12 YALE J. REG. 107, 108 (1995) (describing cases where
courts have relaxed traditional rules of causation to permit hemophiliacs who contracted
HIV from transfusions to collect damages from pharmaceutical companies).
353
See Ruth Gavison, The Implications of Jurisprudential Theories for Judicial
Election, Selection, and Accountability, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1617, 1642 (1998) (stating that
what is unjust may not be the law, but the law’s application to a particular case, for
example the imposition a prison sentence upon an elderly drug addict).
354

See Bhagwat, supra note , 350, at 968 (stating that “bad law” is the “distortion”
of clear rule to reach a “just” result); Markita D. Cooper, Between a Rock and a Hard
Case: Time for a New Doctrine of Compelled Self-Publication, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
373, 402-03 (1997) (explaining how judges and juries, when presented with egregious
(continued...)
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make the law function poorly with respect to more typical fact patterns,
thereby disserving the law’s purposes in most cases.355 This suggests that
allowing injuries to plaintiffs to strongly influence outcomes can prove
problematic.
In public law this problem can prove especially acute. Constitutions
and statutes aim to influence a wide range of future conduct. If a
particularly sympathetic plaintiff secured a favorable statutory and
constitutional interpretation just because of her particular experience, this
might have pernicious effects upon many other individuals and upon
institutions.
The notion that the content of the injury should influence public law
outcomes raises some difficult issues. The most straightforward
explanation as to why injury might influence outcomes would rely upon the
judge’s response to the injury. If the injury seemed bad enough, the judge
might strike down the law producing it. If the injury seemed trivial, the
judge would uphold it.
This model suggests that the judge’s own values, not those of the
constitution or statute she interprets, would control the outcome of the case.
Not only that, but the values in play would come from the litigant’s plight,
not from the legally relevant sources or even the judge’s own views about
the matters made relevant by those sources. Thus, INS v. Chadha,356 which
struck down a legislative veto deporting Chadha, might hinge, not upon an
assessment of the relevant constitutional text, general concerns about
Congressional bills disagreeing with fact specific findings of executive
branch officials, or the effects of legislative vetoes upon democratic
accountability and constitutional structure, but upon the judge’s feelings
about the seriousness of deportation.357 And Clinton might hinge upon
one’s view about the value of extra medicare funding for New York
hospitals, rather than the separation of powers concerns that seem relevant
to the constitutionality of line item vetoes. Surely such an approach would
354

(...continued)
mistreatment of employees by their employers, are tempted to bend the law to afford
victims compensation).
355
See Schauer, supra note 186, at 655-56 (discussing problem of “resultoriented” decision in one case causing too much harm in subsequent cases controlled by
that cases reasoning).
356
462 U.S. 919 (1983).
357
Chadha’s counsel argued that a favorable ruling would make him “a citizen by
the 4th of July.” See BARBARA HINKSON CRAIG, CHADHA: THE STORY OF AN EPIC
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE 211 (1988). He went on to explain the hardship his client
would experience if forced to reply upon his wife’s status as a citizen as the basis for
seeking citizenship. This would involve a long uncertain bureaucratic process placing him
in limbo. Id. Justice White suggested this may have influenced the Court’s decision. See
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 974 (White, J., dissenting) (suggesting Court had struck down all
legislative vetoes based on an “atypical” case).
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raise some questions about legitimacy.358 It is not at all clear that injury
should influence all public law rulings.
On the other hand, the Court’s civil rights jurisprudence lends some
support to the idea that individual injury should influence merits decisions.
Numerous cases showing that particular instances of segregation
disadvantaged black people brought the Court to the point where it
invalidated segregation altogether in Brown v. Board of Education.359 But
the Court did this, not by allowing the individual injuries of the Brown
plaintiffs to make the case more concrete by framing the issue narrowly,
but by acquiring the conviction that a broad factual finding about the state
of the entire society was in order.360 Thus, the Brown Court held that
separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.361
Surely, equal protection law gained something from taking litigants’
experiences of inequality into account.362 Most scholars would agree that
the conditions minorities experienced under apartheid should inform
assessment of whether segregation afforded minorities equal protection.
This may explain why Professor Bickel believed that standing
requirements would make litigation more concrete, in spite of the fact that
the cases he cited to support this idea cast doubt on that conclusion.363 He
may have had then recent civil rights litigation in mind, even though he

358

See Stephen L. Carter, Constitutional Adjudication and the Indeterminate Text:
A Preliminary Defense of an Imperfect Muddle, 94 YALE L. J. 821, 826 (1985) (linking
reliance upon the values of adjudicators to illegitimacy).
359

347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954) (drawing on history of graduate student education
and findings of the lower courts regarding segregation’s effects). See, e.g., Missouri ex.
rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (denial of black student’s application to law
school violates separate but equal doctrine when state provides no law school for blacks);
Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (invalidating conviction in county that had never
called a black juror to serve, after examining detailed record on county practices); Nixon
v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (declaring state delegation of authority to determine party
membership to political parties unconstitutional, when democratic party used that authority
to prohibit blacks from voting); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 364-65 (1914)
(statute subjecting citizens who are not descendants of people with voting rights prior to
1866 to a literacy test violates 15th Amendment, since it tends to deny suffrage to blacks).
Cf. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1926) (declaring a prohibition of negro voting facially
invalid). Of course, the Brown Court did not rely solely upon the experience of case law.
See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95 n. 11 (citing social science studies).
360
See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95 n. 11 (citation to social science seeking to
bridge gap between a particular lower court finding and the general result).
361
Id. at 495.
362
See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (reversing conviction of black
defendants denied counsel after a full trial); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)
(reversing conviction of “ignorant negroes” based on confession extracted through torture);
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) (reversing conviction of black defendants based
on a coerced conviction after examination of a detailed record).
363
See infra note 188.
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used less controversial and inapposite cases to support his point.
All of this suggests several conclusions. Consideration of injury is
sometimes desirable, but not always. And the question of whether injury
should matter to the merits would vary depending on the type of public law
involved.
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR STANDING DOCTRINE AND JUSTICIABILITY
The frequent failure of requirements for injury to make litigation
concrete and its incapacity to do so under many judicial doctrines raises
doubts about the constitutional foundation of standing doctrine.364 The
Court, at times, seems to recognize that experience has crumbled the
theoretical foundation for standing doctrine. Justice Scalia’s law review
article on standing disagrees with the standard view that a requirement of
injury helps assure vigorous argument. He believes that an ideological
plaintiff will likely litigate equally vigorously.365 The claim that standing
fosters better “presentation of issues,” which Scalia has disavowed,
supports the Court’s traditional view that standing aids the concreteness of
litigation.
While the Court has never disavowed the link between concreteness
and its Article III standing doctrine, recent cases place less emphasis on it
than in the past. Indeed, direct references to “concrete adverseness”
nowadays often appear in dissenting or concurring opinions.366
364

Scholars have expressed doubts about standing on non-functional grounds as
well. See, e.g., Pushaw, supra note 74, 82, at 480-82 (arguing that a case historically
required no individualized injury).
365
See Scalia, supra note 57, at 891. Accord Monaghan, supra note 68, at 1385
(there is no necessary connection between a personal interest and sharp presentation of
issues).
366

See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 121
(1998) (Breyer, J., concurring) (standing is meant to ensure “concrete adverseness”); Lewis
v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 399-400 (1996) (Souter J., concurring) (citing need for a “concrete
factual context” as requiring a less demanding standing requirement than the majority
imposes); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 583 (1992) (Stevens J.,
concurring) (claiming that standing should be granted because allegations are adequate to
establish concrete adverseness); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 770 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Cf. Federal Election Commission v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20 (1998) (standing
requirements helps court to avoid “abstract, intellectual problems,” in favor of “concrete
living contests between adversaries”) (citations omitted). Justice Scalia has argued in
dissent that the separation of powers concept of standing displaced the concept of standing
as means of assuring concrete adverseness in Allen v. Wright. See Wyoming v. Oklahoma,
502 U.S. 437, 472 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Court has not endorsed Scalia’s
view, which distorts the case law. First, while the Allen Court emphasized separation of
powers, it linked that concern to the need for framing concrete issues for judicial
resolution, a function the Court identifies with “concrete adverseness.” See Allen, 468 U.S.
at 759-60 (linking separation of powers to need for suits on “identifiable government
(continued...)
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I have already claimed that the Court has not come up with any
other explanation as to why separation of powers concerns or Article III
require injury-based standing. And I have suggested that other doctrines
serve interests in avoiding improper interference in the work of the other
branches better than standing does. The standard rationales the Court
offers support some sort of limitations on jurisdiction, but do not really
explain why the Court requires injury based standing.
Nevertheless, the Court, in Spencer v. Kemna, suggested that a
separation of powers rationale provides support for standing doctrine apart
from that concrete adverseness seeks to provide.367 While the Court has
never explained how separation of powers considerations would support
standing without reference to the ideas of abstraction and concreteness this
article focuses upon, Justice Scalia’s law review article seems to offer an
alternative theory rooted in separation of powers.368 But Scalia’s theory
does not justify injury-in-fact based standing, conflicts with the central
thrust of the Court’s statements about separation of powers, and does not
add up.
Scalia argues that standing should confine courts to their traditional
role of protecting individuals and minorities from majority rule, as opposed
to serving the interest of majorities.369 This concept has influenced the
Court’s decisions to raise the standing bar, even though the Court has not
endorsed the concept it explicitly.370 Scalia himself recognizes that this

366

(...continued)
violations of law” as opposed to “particular” agency “programs”). Second, the Court has
reaffirmed the importance of concrete adverseness repeatedly since Allen. See Gollust v.
Mendell, 501 U.S. 115, 125-26 (1991) (unanimous opinion); International Primate
Protection League v. Administrators of Tulane Educ. Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 78 (1991)
(unanimous opinion); Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 65
n. 5 (1987); United Auto Workers v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 289 (1986); Diamond v.
Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 61-62 (1986); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804
(1985). See also Akins, 524 U.S. at 20 (referring to concrete adverseness indirectly by
contrasting abstract disputes with living contests between adversaries in case decided since
Wyoming v. Oklahoma). But the Court has endorsed the more limited proposition that
assuring concrete adverseness to sharpen presentation of issues is not the only function
standing doctrine performs, which is consistent with this article’s recognition of the idea
of remedial concreteness. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 11 (1998) (per Scalia, J.).
Cf. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 23 n. 2. (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (affirming the centrality of
concrete adverseness). See also Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 462-63 (1998)
(Scalia, J., dissenting and concurring in part) (claiming that the view of standing as only
supporting concrete adverseness has been superseded).
367
See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 11 (concrete adverseness is not the only function that
standing performs).
368
See Scalia, supra note 57, at 894-99.
369
370

See id. at 894.
See, e.g., Defenders, 504 U.S. at 561-62 (Scalia J.) (standing is more difficult
(continued...)

[05/06/03 draft]

STANDING FOR NOTHING

65

concept would require imposition of new requirements going beyond those
embraced in the injury-based standing doctrine.371 Indeed, this conception
makes injury-in-fact beside the point, since the central inquiry should
compare a litigant’s interest to the majority’s to figure out whether a
litigant was in the minority.372
The anti-majoritarian thrust of this theory is noticeably at odds with
the standing cases’ emphasis upon avoiding improper interference with the
democratic branches of government. Presumably, Scalia would answer this
by saying that proper interference serves the interests of minorities, not
majorities. But the idea that interfering with executive branch violations
of law at the behest of beneficiaries of legislative enactments is improper
seems odd to say the least.373 It suggests that the judiciary need not enforce
the law and that Congress must rely on the relatively weak tool of
jawboning (through legislative oversight) or the disruption of funding cutoffs in order to secure executive branch compliance with the constitutional
duty to faithfully execute the law.374 This seems at odds with traditional
notions of separation of powers, since it emphasizes Congressional
enforcement, rather than enactment of law, and denies a judicial role in
enforcement (at least in many cases).
Not only does Scalia’s counter-majoritarian theory fail to justify
current doctrine, it does not add up on its own terms, for reasons central to
the general problem of formalist merits adjudication. Scalia claims that
courts should not protect the majority interest, because they are no good at
it.375 He argues that the judiciary’s tendency to value “abstract principle”
above “concrete result” suits protection of individuals, but not protection

370

(...continued)
to establish when the plaintiff is the not the object of the regulation).
371

See id. at 895 (not all injury would justify standing under this conception).
Cf. id. at 895 (claiming that his conception explains the injury requirement).
373
Scalia’s article suffers some problems of clarity on this point, because his
concept of majority and minority interests lacks definition. He suggests that the harm of
underenforcement of law is a majoritarian harm. Id. at 849. This would suggest, for
example, that beneficiaries of environmental law are in the majority and regulated
industries in the minority (which raises issues under a system where money has influence
and lots of people benefit from corporate production). But then he suggests that a worker
deprived of the benefit of a particular OSHA regulation becomes a minority oppressed by
the majority. Id. at 895. But individuals make up majorities as well as minorities. Scalia
does not explain why this worker isn’t simply one of the individuals in the majority that
secured passage of the relevant legislation. Scalia seems to conflate lack of individual
injury with membership in a majority coalition and existence of injury with participation
in a minority coalition.
374
Cf. Bandes, supra note 65, at 262 (Court’s emphasis on avoiding improper
interference involves a choice not to fulfill Court’s role in making sure that other branches
of government do not exceed their powers).
372

375

Id. at 896.
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of a majority interests.376 He does not explain why merits adjudication in
individual rights cases would be (or should be) based on abstract principle,
or why adjudication on behalf of majority interests would require emphasis
upon concrete results. The analysis presented in this paper suggests that
Scalia basically has it backwards; individual rights cases frequently become
somewhat concrete, while adjudication of majority interests, for example
in the enforcement of statutes, involves somewhat abstract legal
inquiries.377 Of course, adjudication of “minority” interests in less vigorous
enforcement of statutes involves equally abstract inquires, for this minority
interest relies upon the same sort of contrary to law claims that advocates
of stricter regulation must advance to prevail in court. At bottom, Scalia
fails to appreciate the difference between a political decision to enact a law
(which might well be oriented to concrete results) and a judicial decision
about how it should be enforced (which is basically interpretive).
Justice Scalia has also suggested the possibility of relying upon
article II as a source of standing doctrine.378 But that position has not
commanded a majority of the Court.379 While thorough discussion of this
theory would require another article, a brief indication of why this may not
prove satisfactory seems worthwhile. The Article II theory begins with the
premise that the Executive’s power to “take care the law is faithfully
executed” limits other parties’ capacity to sue.380 Historical evidence
contradicts the thesis that the executive power to execute law is exclusive,
for the states played a greater role in executing federal law than the
executive branch of the federal government in the early days of the
376

Id.
Scalia puts forward environmental law as an example of law serving a majority
interest. See id. at 895-97.
377

378

See, e.g., Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States, 529 U.S.
765, 778 n. 8 (2000) (Scalia, J.) (mentioning the possibility of article II limitations upon
standing); Federal Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 36 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (if “the citizenry at large could sue to compel Executive compliance with the
law” then the courts, rather than the executive, would have the primary responsibility to
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”) (citing U.S. Const., Art. II, § 3); Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992) (Congressional creation of citizen
standing to vindicate public interest would transfer the President’s duty to take care that
the law be faithfully executed). See also Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental
Services, 528 U.S. 167, 197, 209 (2000) (concurring and dissenting opinions) (flagging but
declining to address article II theory of standing).
379
See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 102 n. 4
(1998) (Scalia, J.) (standing jurisprudence derives from Article III, not Article II).
380

See generally Stephen G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s
Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L. J. 541 (1994); Stephen G. Calabresi & Kevin H.
Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 1153 (1992); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L. J. 1725
(1996); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994).
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Republic.381 Such an interpretation would disregard the historic role of
state, territorial, and tribal governments in executing laws, not to mention
private parties.382
An exclusive executive enforcement power would not justify an
injury-in-fact theory of standing. It would instead require disallowance of
all private, state, tribal, and territorial actions litigating federal public law
questions, including actions brought by seriously injured parties.383
Furthermore, all litigants seeking judicial review, whether on
statutory or constitutional grounds, claim that the executive branch has not
faithfully executed the law. It is hard to see how the responsibility to
execute the law faithfully should limit claims that the executive branch has
violated the law.384
Standing doctrine’s frequent failure to perform the purposes
justifying its place under Article III suggests that the Court ought to
reconsider standing doctrine. Injury’s contribution of concreteness to as
applied individual rights cases cannot justify standing as an overarching
constitutional requirement governing a wide variety of cases where injury
is substantively irrelevant.385
381
See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV.
1957 (1993) (discussing extensive reliance upon state officials to enforce federal law prior
to the advent of a large federal bureaucracy). See also Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and
the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2199 (1998)
(discussing framer’s expectation that federal government could rely upon state executive
officers to enforce federal law).
382
See Vermont, 529 U.S. at 774-77 (recognizing the historic pedigree of private
qui tam actions to enforce federal law); Hodel v. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n,
452 U.S. 264, 289 (1981) (recognizing and approving the cooperative federalism
arrangement pervading environmental law); Nance v. EPA, 645 F.2d 701, 712-15 (9th Cir.
1981) (upholding delegation of federal authority to Indian Tribe).
383

Cf. Buzbee, supra note 191, at 283 (pointing out the incongruity of Scalia’s
suggesting an article II basis for standing without even arguing that citizens can never
enforce statutory law).
384
See Sunstein, supra note 96, at 1471 (the “Take Care” clause does not
authorize the executive branch to violate the law); Cass R. Sunstein, Informational
Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 647
(1999) (ruling that an executive branch official has violated the law at the behest of a
citizen does no violence to article II). See also Buzbee, supra note 191, at 274-277
(discussing how citizen suits can only enforce detailed political judgments embodied in
regulations and statutes).
385
Numerous critics have suggested that standing requirements under article III
should yield to a principle of allowing Congress to create causes of action as it sees fit. See
Fletcher, supra note 64, at 223 (proposing abandonment of the view that Article III requires
injury-in-fact); Sunstein, supra note 96, 1461-62 (Article III does not limit authority to
adjudicate Congressionally created causes of action); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia,
Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42 DUKE L. J. 1141, 1169 (1993) (the Constitution
does not require the private rights model embraced in Defenders of Wildlife); Richard J.
(continued...)
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Of course, standing doctrine has never been applied consistently, as
many critics have frequently noted.386 This raises the possibility that
standing requirements might vary its demands with doctrinal needs for
concreteness.387 Current practice does not vary standing demands in such
a systematic fashion. For example, many observers claim that the Court
has been especially demanding in the environmental area, even though
individual injury has little to do with the merits of many environmental
claims reaching the Supreme Court.388
The suggestion that standing might vary with needs for concreteness
in individual cases might support retention of ripeness jurisprudence, but
abandonment of standing requirements. For the ripeness doctrine does
engage in an inquiry into a particular case’s need for concrete context.389
Even without an injured litigant, the Court could dismiss a case where the
law has not been applied to clarify the scope of the challenger’s claim. And
mootness could still function to bar abstract orders, where ideological
plaintiffs seek orders that remedy hypothetical misconduct that seems
unlikely to occur.
The expansion of certiorari jurisdiction since Bickel wrote lessens
the need for justiciability doctrine to avoid or postpone decision at the

385

(...continued)
Pierce, Jr. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife as a Judicially Imposed Limit on Legislative
Power, 42 DUKE L. J. 1170, 1178 (1993); Buzbee, supra note 191, at 283. This article
shows that a functional approach supports this same conclusion.
386
See, e.g. Bandes, supra note 65, at 266 (stating the injuries similar to those
found insufficient in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, Laird v. Tatum, and Sierra Club v.
Morton have justified standing in other cases); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Causation as a
Standing Requirement: The Unprincipled Use of Judicial Restraint, 69 KY. L. J. 185, 212
(1980) (complaining about judicial manipulation of redressability requirement); Nichol,
supra note 50; Fletcher, supra note 64, (discussing in detail the concept of injury and its
relationship to the merits).
387
See Bandes, supra note 65, at 269 (arguing that adversity and matters of
concreteness are matters of degree and that the “requisite quantity” of these attributes
should vary according to the case’s nature).
388
See Katherine B. Steuer & Robin L. Juni, Note, Court Access for
Environmental Plaintiffs: Standing Doctrine in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 15 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 187, 188 (1991) (the Supreme Court’s Lujan decision renders the injury-infact requirement of standing more difficult to meet in environmental citizen suits).
389
See Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A
Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L. J. 517, 531 (1966) (suggesting that flexible application of
the ripeness doctrine reflects the Court’s view that some cases require more factual context
than others). Some of the cases analyzed in this article, however, suggest that the Court
often imagines that concrete facts will clarify a case where an analysis of the relevant
substantive law suggests that they would not. See infra notes 250-256 and accompanying
text.
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Supreme Court level.390 But justiciability continues to remain an important
tool for limiting or postponing decisions in the lower federal courts.391 So,
passive virtues should continue to play some role, albeit a reduced one.
Since a litigant without injury can bring concreteness to a case by
discovering facts about others’ injuries, there seems to be no strong need
for a standing doctrine even in cases where concreteness does help. The
Court can demand concreteness through its approach to the merits of
claims. As long as the Court responds to injuries on the merits, lawyers
will bring somebody’s concrete experience into their cases.
Of course, all of these arguments assume that standing law should
perform some function.392 Standing doctrine will likely persist, precisely
because of the Court’s formalist tendencies. Standing doctrine sets out a
set of formal rules. Those rules have no basis in the text of the constitution,
which, after all, authorizes jurisdiction over cases and controversies, terms
that collectively may embrace a wide range of types of judicial
proceedings.393 And, in light of the long tradition of relator and public
actions requiring no injury, many commentators have concluded that
standing has no basis in original intent either.394 Still, at this point, stare
decisis supports standing. Under these circumstances, recognition that
experience has revealed the doctrine’s futility may have a more modest
result than killing the doctrine outright or confining it to some as applied
individual rights challenges.395 Perhaps this recognition should lead to
more liberal treatment of injury, which might include less use of heightened
390

See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 80 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(Court should have denied certiorari in case seeking adjudication of whether constitution
limits visitation rights of grandparents). I am grateful to Harry Wellington for this
suggestion.
391
I am grateful to Richard Fallon for emphasizing this.
392

See Scharpf, supra note 389, at 534 (Bickel’s justification for the passive
virtues “is, at bottom, a functional one.”).
393
See Pushaw, supra note 74, 82, at 480-482, 526-27 (arguing that cases do not
involve controversies between adverse parties); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 559 (1992) (suggesting that the literal language of the Constitution cannot justify
standing doctrine by pointing out that an executive inquiry can be called a “case” and a
“”legislative dispute” can constitute a “controversy”).
394
See Nichol, supra note 385, at 1151-52 (discussing historical evidence); Raoul
Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional Requirement, 78 YALE L.
J. 816, 840 (1969) (calling the notion that the constitution demands injury to a personal
interest “historically unfounded.”); Pushaw, supra note 55, at 477-485 (arguing that a neofederalist approach would allow standing without injury-in-fact, if Congress or the
constitution authorized suit). See also Evan Camminker, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam
Actions, 99 YALE L. J. 341 (1989) (examining the long history of one cause of action not
requiring injury).
395
See generally Schauer, supra note 186, at 655 (explaining that reliance on
general reasoning affecting multiple hypothetical cases makes the requirement of a
“concrete case” seem “peculiar.”)
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pleading requirements to screen out injured plaintiffs and more generous
application of the doctrine that a court should view a plaintiff’s challenged
allegations of injury in the light most favorable to the plaintiff on summary
judgment.396 Lowering these barriers to presentation of facts might increase
the flow of concrete experience into the courtroom and therefore might do
more to improve concreteness than standing doctrine ever did.397
E. PASSIVE VIRTUES REVISITED: THE ACTIVE VIRTUES
Since standing doctrine has not realized its promise to make
litigation more concrete, we should revisit our vision of passive virtues.
The hope that doctrines limiting which parties can get into court would
significantly improve the wisdom and quality of judicial decision-making
on the merits seems,398 well, rather indirect.399 A litigant with standing
almost always will come along sooner or late to seek adjudication of an
issue.400 The Court’s decisions in Bush v. Gore,401 United States v.

396

See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 528 (1975) (Brennan J., dissenting)
(arguing that Court denied standing through application of a heightened pleading standard);
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 590-93 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that the Court did not properly apply summary judgment principles in denying
standing). Cf. Winter, supra note 62, at 1373 (standing law has increasingly restricted
claims against the government); Nichol, supra note 385, at 1167 (describing how the Court
bolstered standing requirements over two decades).
397
See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 71 U.S.L.W. 4602, 4605 (2003) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (need for fuller factual record justifies dismissal of writ of certiorari for case
decided below on the pleadings after briefing and oral argument). See generally Patricia
M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1942-43 (1998) (raising the
issue of whether summary judgment and increased emphasis on pleading are cutting federal
courts off from human experience).
398
See Katyal, supra note ?, at 1713 (Bickel’s passive virtues focused upon
avoiding decisions through denials of certiorari and doctrines of standing, ripeness, and
political questions)
399
Standing doctrine may have emerged as a reaction against Lochnerism, since
rejected on the merits. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 107 (1968) (Douglas J. dissenting)
(suggesting that allowing standing in the Frothingham case in 1923 “accentuated an
ominous trend to judicial supremacy”); Winter, supra note 62, at 1455-1457 (suggesting
that standing doctrine allowed liberals to avoid Lochner-era vices).
400
See Scharpf, supra note 389, at 536 (standing and other justiciability restraints,
apart from the political question doctrine, avoid a case, not the constitutional issue
involved).
401

531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam) (holding that Florida should not recount
ballots in the 2000 Presidential election). See Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the
Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 Yale L. J. 1407, 1407-1408 (2001) (Bush v. Gore
has shaken many academics’ confidence in judicial review, because of its highly partisan
nature).
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Lopez,402 and United States v. Morrison403 may demonstrate that standing
cannot effectively constrain an activist judiciary.404 The ideal of judicial
practices designed to improve the concreteness of public law, even if some
of it can never be terribly concrete because of its fundamental structure,
does have merit.405 But these practices must address how the Court handles
the merits when it does reach them, not just how the Court might postpone
the day when it reaches the merits.406
1. CONFINING DECISION TO BRIEFED ISSUES
The Court often emphasizes that standing and other judicial
doctrines assure adverse presentations helping to define and illuminate the
issues before them. Even if the Court has proper litigants (however
defined) before it, the adverse presentation does the Court no good if it
decides issues that the parties have not briefed.407
The Court’s doctrine demands that the Court confine itself to

402

514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding for the first time since the New Deal, that
Congress has exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause).
403

529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that Congress lacked the authority under the
Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment to enact the Violence Against Women
Act). See William W. Buzbee and Robert A. Shapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54
STAN. L. REV. 87, 110-111 (2001) (characterizing Morrison as the first case in more than
50 years to reject a Congressional finding that regulated activities substantially affect
interstate commerce); Catharine A. Mackinnon, Disputing Male Sovereignty: On United
States v. Morrison, 114 HARV. L. REV. 135, 135 (2000) (Morrison is only the second case
since reconstruction to invalidate a federal aniti-discrimination statute).
404
Since litigants in all of these cases had standing, the Court was able to
aggressively interpret constitutional constraints on legislative power.
405
See Tushnet, supra note 68, at 1707 (suggesting several procedural devices to
serve standing’s goal of aiding understanding of a decision’s consequences).
406
See Katyal, supra note ?, at 1712-1715 (linking constructive use of silences and
giving of advise in merits opinions to Bickel’s passive virtues); Sunstein, supra note 155,
at 51 (linking minimalist reasoning on the merits to Bickel’s passive virtues). See, e.g.,
Elliott, supra note 136, at 131 (suggesting that even if the Court had avoided deciding
Chadha, other cases challenging legislative vetoes on the Court’s docket would have
forced it to address the issues of the technique’s constitutionality).
407
See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 121 (1998)
(Breyer, J., concurring) (criticizing parts of the majority opinion not informed by parties’
briefing as not benefitting “from the `concrete adverseness’ the standing doctrine is meant
to ensure.”) Cf. Fiss, supra note 33, at 13 (“The judge is entitled to exercise power only
after he has participated in a dialogue about the meaning of public values.”)
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briefed issues.408 But the Court often ignores this doctrine.409 Indeed,
justicability doctrines undermine the practice of only resolving issues
briefed by the parties.410 For they require that the Court consider
jurisdictional defects whether or not the parties raise them.411 The Court
should adopt a simple solution to that problem. When it sees a potential
jurisdictional defect not adequately briefed by the parties, it should order
briefing.412 It should not decide those issues, or any other, without briefing.
A less obvious problem comes from judicial selection of rationales
for resolution of briefed issues. The Court sometimes chooses rationales
that neither party briefs.413 This carries with some of the same risks of
unwise decision-making that come from deciding unbriefed issues. And
the Court can address this by requesting supplement briefing when it sees
the need to venture beyond the rationales offered by the parties. But even
this may not suffice if none of the parties has an interest in the rationale that

408

See, e.g., Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 734 n. 8
(1997) (issue of whether a litigant making a takings claim has exhausted available state
procedures not considered, because not briefed).
409
See, e.g., Devins, supra note 99, at 261-262 (explaining that the Court in Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins overruled Swift v. Tyson even though no party sought that
ruling); Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 915 n. 16 (1989) (Blackmun
J., dissenting) (chiding the majority for addressing ripeness when it was not briefed or
argued).
410
See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 636-37 (1979) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (chiding majority for mootness dismissal when defendant below did not argue
this point); FW/PBS, Inc., v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 214, 231-32 (1990) (finding a lack
of standing when no party raised the issue). The Dallas case shows how this failure makes
litigation abstract. Because both parties thought no standing issue existed, the record
lacked facts demonstrating standing. Id. at 234-35. Dallas’ attorney believed that some
of the Petitioners lost licenses to run adult entertainment businesses under the provisions
they sought to challenge. Id. at 236. If so, then the Court decided the standing issue based
on a hypothetical set of facts constructed from an inadequate record, rather than the facts
of the “living contest” that gave rise to the litigation. Cf. id. at 250 (Stevens J., concurring)
(saying he would remand for an evidentiary hearing, rather than order dismissal on standing
grounds).
411
See Devins, supra note 99, at 258 (if the plaintiff lacks standing, the judiciary
must dismiss the case, whether or not the defendant raises a standing defect); Lewis v.
Casey, 518 U.S. 341, 393 (1996) (Souter J., concurring) (chiding majority for its treatment
of standing in a case where neither party raised it);. See also Reno v. Catholic Social
Services, 509 U.S. 43, 57 n. 18 (1993) (Court may raise non-jurisdictional ripeness defect
on its own motion).
412
See, e.g., Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 66 (1997)
(Court called for briefing on standing when it granted petition for certiorari). Cf. Reno, 509
U.S. at 57 n. 18, 67-68 (majority resolves ripeness claim only briefly touched upon in the
briefs).
413
See S. Ct. Rule 14(1)(a) (“a question presented is deemed to comprise every
subsidiary question fairly included therein”).
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the Court believes serves the purposes of the law.414
Current doctrine, however, allows the Court to use rationales
offered by no party, as long the Court confines itself to issues the parties
raise.415 Because the line between an issue and a rationale can be very
blurry,416 allowing original rationales can undermine the rule limiting the
Court to briefed issues.
2. PREFERRING NARROW GROUNDS FOR DECISION
Whether or not the plaintiff experiences injury, judges make choices
about whether to choose narrow or broad grounds for decisions.417 An
injured plaintiff under current doctrines licenses the Court to decide the
case on any grounds it finds sensible (although the Court’s usually chooses
to confine itself to questions presented by litigants).418 And it can choose

414

See, e.g., Devins, supra note 99, at 262 (the Justices deciding Erie understood
that neither party would call for the overruling of Swift - even if the Court specifically
requested briefing on the issue).
415
See id. at 282 (once an issue is before the Court, the Court should look to the
“law”, not just the arguments of the parties, to resolve the case);
416
For example, in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense Fund, 473 U.S. 788
(1984), the Court addressed a first amendment challenge to the exclusion of advocacy
organizations from a government charitable solicitation drive. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at
790. The Court declined to resolve the “issue” of whether the government excluded the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund “because it disagreed with their view points”, since that issue
“was neither decided nor fully briefed before this Court.” If the Court had defined the issue
as whether the exclusion violated the First Amendment, then the “issue” of motivation
might become an argument about broader free speech issue, rather than a separate issue.
See also Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 734 (1997) (dividing
the question of the ripeness of a takings claim into two sub-issues, whether an agency has
made a final land use decision and whether the applicant has sought compensation through
available administrative procedures); Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1484-1485 (2002) (identifying theories that were
separate issues not before them and three theories as “fairly encompassed” within the facial
takings claim before the Court).
417
See Sunstein, supra note 155 (discussing judicial “minimalism”).
418
See Pushaw, supra note 74, 82, 489-493 (cases confer upon judges the right to
“expound” the law). See, e.g., Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 535 (1992)
(acknowledging that the Court has occasionally asked litigants to brief issues not raised in
the petition for certiorari). Cf. Liverpool, N.Y. & Philadelphia S.S. Co. v. Commissioners
of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885) (citing rule forbidding formulation of a “rule of
constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be
applied.”); Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 330 (1991) (White, J., dissenting) (citing this
rule); Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 472 U.S. 491, 501 (1985) (citing this rule); Broderick
v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 609-615 (1973) (declining to find facial overbreadth when
alleged overbreadth appears insubstantial).
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broad grounds for decision-making if it wants to.419
Narrow decisions tend toward concreteness. They rely less on
general abstractions about law and a little more upon specific reasons for
particular outcomes in a case.
Narrow decisions would have another benefit; they might lessen the
number of concurring decisions.420 These days, multiple long Supreme
Court opinions giving a wide variety of grounds for decisions of varying
scope seem fairly common.421 Such opinions can leave the law in a state of
confusion.422 If judges directed substantial energy toward finding narrow
grounds for agreement, one might see shorter clearer opinions (and fewer
of them) in some cases.423
Judges care about matters other than the concreteness of their
decisions for perfectly good reasons. Narrow decisions can lead to
incoherence in the law, through the proliferation of numerous individual
results tied together by no coherent set of principles.424 Dormant commerce
clause jurisprudence regarding interstate taxation offers perhaps the best
example of this problem.425
419

See Fallon, supra note 78, at 24 (Court routinely issues broad pronouncements
and occasionally renders alternative holdings to achieve “doctrinal clarification on multiple
fronts.”); Sunstein, supra note 155, at 15 (claiming that no consensus exists on the
appropriateness of minimalism).
420
Cf. Sunstein, supra note 155, at 17, 20 (suggesting that concrete narrow
decisions can bring together a multi-member court).
421
See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (question of
transient jurisdiction generating three opinions); Regents of the University of California
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (no majority opinion).
422
See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 63-64 (1996) (describing
lower court confusion in the wake of the Union Gas Court’s failure to agree upon a
rationale); Grutter v. Bollinger, slip op. at 12-13 (2003) (describing lower court confusion
in the wake of multiple opinions in Bakke and acknowledging difficulty of applying the test
for interpreting such opinions).
423

See, e.g., Yee, 503 U.S. at 539 (Blackmun J., concurring, and Stevens J.,
concurring) (both concurrences generated by unnecessary remarks in the majority opinion
regarding an issue the Court had concluded was not within the scope of the question
presented); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 394 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring) (Court’s
decision to address a standing issue prevented issuance of a unanimous opinion on the
question forming the basis for certiorari).
424
See Grutter v. Bollinger, slip op. at 9 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that
making diversity a compelling state interest in one context, but not in another, is
unprincipled). Cf. Sunstein, supra note 155, at 16 (discussing Justice Scalia’s view that
broad rules serves rule of law values).
425
See Camps Newfound/Athena, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Me, 520 U.S. 564,
610-11 (1997) (Thomas, J. dissenting) (calling dormant commerce clause jurisprudence
unworkable and citing numerous statements by justices referring to this jurisprudence as
a “quagmire” or otherwise remarking on its incoherence); Lisa Heinzerling, The
Commercial Constitution, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 217, 217 (discussing the ubiquity of dormant
(continued...)
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Furthermore, narrow decisions can raise transaction costs.426
Decisions at a high degree of generality, such as the Court’s much
maligned sovereign immunity jurisprudence and its celebrated Brown
decision, can clarify the contours of a large number of situations at once.427
Hence, the decision about whether to prefer narrow grounds of
decision will necessarily involve many considerations.428 But it does offer
a potential means of increasing the concreteness of decisions.
The desire to write narrow decisions can conflict with the desire to
address the precise issues briefed. If the litigants frame the issues broadly,
then a narrow decision may not benefit from party presentation of issues.429
The narrowly framed issue can lose, to use a poorly chosen term, concrete
adverseness. But the Court can solve that problem by adopting a practice
of asking for supplemental briefing on narrowly defined questions when
litigants frame a dispute too broadly.430
The Court’s practice of disfavoring facial challenges serves the
function that the Court wrongly assigns to the standing doctrine, avoidance

425

(...continued)
commerce clause rulings); Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Business:
Perspectives on Two Centuries of Constitutional Adjudication, 41 TAX LAW. 37, 44 (1987)
(chiding the Court for line drawing “discernible, if at all, only to itself”); D. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 1789-1888, 234
(1985) (describing this jurisprudence as arbitrary and conclusory); LAWRENCE TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 439 (1988) (describing jurisprudence as “ad hoc” and
not based on “consistent application of coherent principles”). I am not suggesting that
dormant commerce clause cases rely upon injury to produce concreteness. Cf. Hunt v.
Washington Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343-44, 353-54 (1976) (injuries
focus on economic burdens, but resolution of merits focus on lack of consumer benefits
associated with those burdens). Indeed, this area combines narrow rulings with abstraction.
See, e.g., Harrison, 520 U.S. at 568-69, 575-76, 595 (limitation on tax exemption available
for charities benefitting out-of-state residents facially discriminates and therefore violates
the dormant commerce clause, in spite of lack of impact on national markets).
426

See Sunstein, supra note 155, at 17 (linking narrow decisions to high costs for
litigants and judges in subsequent cases).
427

Cf. Elliott, supra note 136, at 162 (suggesting possibility that the broad opinion
in Chadha might be a “wise exercise of judicial statesmanship”)
428
See Sunstein, supra note 155 (discussing some relevant considerations).
429

See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 273, at 791-92 (pointing out that the disputants
in Chadha may not have defined the issue narrowly).
430
See, e.g., Regents of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 281 (1978) (plurality
opinion) (Court requested supplemental briefing on statutory civil rights claim in hopes of
obviating need to resolve a constitutional equal protection issue); Yee v. Escondido, 503
U.S. 519, 535 (1992) (Court has “on occasion” asked litigants “to address an important
question of law not raised in the petition for certiorari”). A more modest, and probably
insufficient cure, would rely upon narrow questions at oral argument. Cf. R.A.V. v. St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381-382 n.3, 397-398 (1992) (majority relied upon theory raised only
in oral argument and a reply brief, and concurrence considered the theory not to have been
briefed).
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of improper interference with democratic decisions.431 It does this,
however, with sensitivity to doctrine specific needs to interfere sufficiently
with democratic decisions to avoid abridgment of constitutional rights.
This need justifies, for example, the Court’s willingness to strike down
laws as overly vague or broad under the First Amendment, even though
such laws may have many valid applications.432
The Court, however, at times, properly disallows as-applied
challenges and limits litigants to facial challenges. For example, under the
Commerce Clause, the Court, even after the revival of judicial limitation of
Congressional regulatory power under Morrison and Lopez, subscribes to
the rule that a regulatory program remains constitutional even if a particular
commercial application of that program might violate the commerce clause
if viewed in isolation.433 This rule also limits improper interference, by
eschewing interference with programs addressing problems that
substantially affect interstate commerce through the aggregation of
seemingly local activities.434 One may question whether the Court has
interfered improperly with democratic decision-making in this area in spite
of these limits and ask whether the Court should simply rely on the political
decision-making process to restrain federal power in light of the history of
arbitrary abstraction in this area.435 Still this rule against facial challenges
constrains interference and shows that the desire for concreteness in
adjudication must sometimes yield to larger concerns. This exception to
preference for narrow grounds shows that the rule favoring narrow
decisions must be subject to some bounds and remain flexible.
This article’s exploration of the paradox created by insisting upon
431

See Erzonik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975) (caution is
needed when considering facial challenges, because invalidation can unnecessarily
interfere with state regulatory programs).
432

See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L. J. 853
(1991); Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970);
Dorf, supra note 85, at 261-279 (arguing the overbreadth doctrine protects against chilling
of protected conduct); Virginia v. Hicks, 71 U.S.L.W. 4441, 4442 (2003) (same). See, e.g.,
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 (1999) (striking down anti-loitering ordinance
as impermissibly vague on its face).
433
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995) (when “a . . . regulatory
statute bears a substantial relationship to interstate commerce, the de minimis character of
individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence.”) (citation omitted);
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000) (reaffirming the Lopez framework);
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corp of Engineers,
531 U.S. 159, 173 (2001) (affirming that the Court would have to consider regulated
activity in the aggregate to adjudicate constitutionality of Clean Water Act jurisdiction).
434
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558; John Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause
Meets the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, 97 MICH. L. REV. 174 (1998) (discussing the
aggregation issue in light of Lopez).
435

See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 603-608 (Souter J., dissenting); Morrison, 529 U.S. at
628-655 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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proof on injury even as the Court’s jurisprudence diminishes injury’s
relevance436 provides some tools for clarifying the debate regarding facial
versus applied challenges, a debate about when a Court should strike down
a statute as invalid and when it should hold that a statute is only invalid as
applied to a particular litigant. Several commentators have suggested that
a continuum exists between a pure as-applied challenge and a facial
challenge that strikes down a rule in its entirety.437 This article’s analysis
helps clarify the nature of the continuum.
The as-applied end of the continuum involves challenges where the
intensity of injury or defendant misconduct influences the merits, as in
takings cases and procedural due process cases.438 In such cases, even
when a plaintiff challenges a formal legal rule, the result of the case is
likely to have uncertain precedential significance upon the challenged rule
itself, since intensity and the nature of injury can vary from case to case.
In these cases, the injury performs the function of making the consequences
of an application of legal rules clear. The Court’s focus on individual
consequences, however, obscures the case’s significance for the rule as a
whole.439
In the middle of the continuum, the Court explicitly invalidates part
of a rule, but not all of it.440 The Court may use a categorization of the
injury to frame the issue it does resolve or the relief it offers instead of
exploring the injury’s intensity.441 But since both the Courts and lawyers
can frame issues broadly or widely, the injury does not determine the

436

See, e.g., Isserles, supra note 219, at 435 n. 340, 448-51 (discussing examples
of doctrinal shifts away from consideration of effects upon individuals in the free exercise
area). See generally Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 312 (discussing conceptions of free
exercise based on formal equality and conceptions based on “privileges”).
437

See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 85, at 294 (distinction between facial and as-applied
challenges may confuse more than it illuminates).
438
See State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct.
1513, 1521 (2003) (degree of defendant misconduct measured, in part, by seriousness of
plaintiff’s injuries, bears upon constitutionality of a punitive damages award); Connecticut
v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 4, 14-16 (1991) (relying upon potential injury, i.e. the risk of
erroneous deprivation in a litigant’s particular situation, to justify a holding that a
prejudgment statute violated his due process rights).
439
See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 71-72 (2000) (plurality opinion)
(using information about parent’s conduct in limiting grandfather’s visitation and reasoning
of a state trial court judge to frame an as applied challenge, thereby leaving the opinion
unclear as to the overall validity of Washington’s statute).
440
See, e.g., United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960) (holding that Congress
may proscribe state interference with voting rights under statute that proscribed state or
private interference with voting rights).
441

See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399, 402-406, 407-408, 420 (1989)
(framing the issue in terms of Johnson’s conduct, categorized as expressive).
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breadth of these holdings or the remedies.442 Furthermore, the Court need
not employ injury to frame the case at all. Instead, it may focus on the
government defendant’s identity or conduct,443 the holding of a lower
courts,444 or its own view of the subrule it wants to adjudicate to frame the
case445. Because of this fluidity many cases can be characterized as either
challenges to rules or as challenges to application of rules.446
Finally, many statutory challenges to administrative regulations,
most structural constitutional law challenges, and a significant number of
individual rights cases involve facial challenges, where the principal issue
is whether a rule violates some constitutional or statutory norm.447 As,
legal tests become more formal, facial challenges should become more
common, because formal tests do not depend upon intensity of injury at all,
442

See, e.g., Johnson, 491 U.S. at 399, 403 n. 3 (framing issue in terms of
expressive conduct generally, not just demonstrations at the Republican National
Convention). See generally Frederick Schauer, supra note 186 (explaining that reasons
always go beyond the facts they relate to); Frederick Schauer, The Generality of Rights, 6
J. LEGAL THEORY 323 (2000).
443
See Raines, 362 U.S. at 25 (limiting challenge to statutory subrule framed by
defendant’s identity as state officials); Dusenberry v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 168-169
(2002) (challenge to constitutional adequacy of notice framed in terms of defendant’s
conduct in delivering a certified letter under a statute that authorized use of the mail
generally); Isserles, supra note 219, at 433 (describing challenge to statute construed to
conform to a particular context as an as applied challenge).
444
See Isserles, supra note 219, at 429-430 (suggesting that challenges to statutes
narrowed through judicial construction may be considered as facial challenges).
445
See Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536, 1556-1557 (2003) (Stevens J.,
concurring) (accusing plurality of adjudicating an as applied challenge based on a
construction implicit in a trial court’s jury instruction, and incorrectly labeling it a facial
challenge).
446
See Adler, supra note 303, at 36, 37, 156-157 (characterizing most cases as
involving rights against rules); Isserles, supra note 303, at 423-451 (characterizing many
cases as involving as applied challenges); Fallon, supra note 218, at 1368 (arguing that asapplied challenges remain the norm). It is possible that further inquiry might lead to a less
agnostic position, but if so this would probably require more elaboration of definitions of
as-applied and facial challenges than I can offer in this article. I confine myself to
describing the basic illumination the concreteness paradox provides without extensive
further analysis.
447
See Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 8 (1981)
(facial invalidity involves the “relationship” between the rule and the applicable
constitutional law); Isserles, supra note 219, at 405 (equating facial challenges to
regulations under a statute with facial challenges to the constitutionality of a statute); Dorf,
supra note 85, at 260 (Court views drawing of discriminatory lines as a constitutional
violation, irrespective of their effects). See, e.g.,Troxel, 530 U.S. at 75-79 (Souter, J.,
concurring) (resolving facial challenge to statute allowing any person visitation rights when
visitation serves the child’s best interests); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 334 (prohibition
on signs critical of a foreign government is an invalid content-based restriction of speech);
Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 102 (1972) (prohibition of all picketing
of schools except peaceful labor picketing was an invalid content-based restriction).
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but upon the formal properties of legal rules and resolution of conflict of
law claims.448
In another variant of the paradox between formalism and insistence
on concreteness, the Court seems to be demanding more facial challenges
at the same time that some of its members question their legitimacy on the
basis of a private rights model. The Salerno rule, which suggests that a
litigant must show that every application of a rule is invalid in order to
prevail in a facial challenge,449 seems to reflect a view that constitutional
litigation hinges upon the intensity of injuries, when many cases involve
some analysis of conflict of law claims.450 But in Salerno itself, the Court
engaged in an abstract analysis that properly focused upon general
reasoning about whether the constitution permitted pre-trial detentions
based upon risks to the community’s safety, rather than risk of pre-trial
flight.451 The broader perspective this article offers, by extending the rights
against rules thesis beyond the area of individual rights, confirms that
Salerno properly affirms the legitimacy of adjudication of facial conflict of
laws claims. 452 The preference for narrow decisions involves an eagerness
to seize narrower grounds when they are available. It does not, however,
suggest that broad decisions are per se illegitimate.453
Concreteness after the private law model requires that the Court
frame issues in terms of the facts of the case, use those facts to examine the
challenged laws affects, and provide rationales linking the case’s results to
those facts. This approach can work for a number of doctrinal tests in the
individual rights area, especially when the doctrines permit consideration
of effects. But it requires a court to choose that approach in the face of
some reasons to become more abstract. That choice, unlike decisions about
standing, can enhance the concreteness of litigation.
3. ADDING CONTEXT AND CULTIVATING HUMILITY

448

See Isserles, supra note 219, at 363-64 (a facial “valid rule challenge”
challenges a “defect inhering in the statute itself”).
449
See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
450
See Isserles, supra note 219, at 383 (Salerno’s test seems to require a
Herculean effort to demonstrate that each and every hypothetical application of a statute
is invalid). Professor Isserles, however, concludes that Salerno’s test should be read as not
requiring the hypothetical inquiry it seems on its face to call for. Id. at 386-88.
451
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747-749. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
739-40 (1997) (Stevens J., concurring) (we have never applied the test Salerno suggests,
not even in Salerno).
452
Isserles, supra note 219, at 387 (a facial challenge demonstrates that the terms
of a statute contains a “constitutional infirmity” when measured against “relevant
constitutional doctrine”)
453
See Isserles, supra note 219, (judgment about whether to strike down a statute
on its face or to adjudicate more narrowly must rest upon assessment of “practical effects”).
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These days, the Court seems quite confident, perhaps overly
confident, about its ability to discern the meaning of the constitution with
respect to vexing issues of federalism and separation of powers.454
Although the Court recognizes functional considerations that invite
considerations of context, it sometimes makes judgments without good
information about relevant context.
For example, take the sovereign immunity cases. Making the states
immune from private damage suits, as the Court’s sovereign immunity
jurisprudence does, raises functional issues under the Supremacy Clause.455
Since that clause requires that federal law remain supreme, even the
modern Court agrees that states must comply with federal law.456 This
raises the issue of whether disallowing private suits will liberate the states
from compliance. The Court answers this question by assuming that states
will comply with federal law even without private enforcement and by
pointing out that federal enforcement (as opposed to private enforcement)
remains available under the Court’s sovereign immunity law.457 Yet, the
Court considered no data about the validity of the assumption that states
will generally comply with federal law absent private enforcement.458 It
obviously did not have an adequate basis for its conclusion that states’
willingness to comply and federal enforcement (which might be sporadic
454

See, e.g., Timothy Zick, Marbury Ascendant: The Rehnquist Court and the
Power to “Say What the Law Is”, 59 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 839, 844 (2002) (discussing
declining deference to Congressional interpretation of 14th Amendment); Buzbee &
Shapiro, supra note ? (discussing the Court’s lack of deference toward legislative
findings).
455

See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 731-73 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Florida
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 153-158 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting).
456
See U.S. Const. Art. VI; Alden, 527 U.S. at 754-55, 757. Cf. Idaho v. Coeur
d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 278 (1997) (need to “promote the supremacy of federal law
must be accommodated to the constitutional immunity of the states”) (citation omitted).
457

See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 71 n. 14; Alden, 527 U.S. at 755. In addition,
suits for injunctive relief may lie against state officials acting in their official capacities.
See Alden, 527 U.S. at 756-57 (some suits against state officials permitted). See, e.g.,
Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Services Comm’n of Maryland, 122 S. Ct. 1753, 1756
(2002) (holding that telecommunications company may sue state officials in their official
capacities under federal law). Cf. Idaho, 521 U.S. at 281-88 (1997) (declining to authorize
a suit against state officials when state title to land is at stake); Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole
Tribe, The Eleventh Amendment, and the Potential Evisceration of Ex Parte Young, 72
N.Y.U. L. REV. 495 (1997). Congress may abrogate state immunity when acting under the
14th Amendment. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59; Alden, 527 U.S. at 756. Cf. City
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (construing Congressional enforcement power
under the 14th amendment narrowly); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary v. College Savings
Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 630 (1999) (patent infringement statute not enacted to enforce due
process guarantees of the 14th amendment). And states may consent to suit. See Alden,
527 U.S. at 755.
458

Cf. Seminole Tribes, 517 U.S. at 157 n. 52 (Souter, J., dissenting) (expressing
skepticism about the efficacy of remaining remedies).
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because of resource constraints) produces substantial state compliance.459
Hence, its conclusion that sovereign immunity does not conflict with the
Supremacy Clause appears suspect.460 The Court will likely make better
judgments about the congruence of broad sovereign immunity with the
Supremacy Clause if it remains aware of its information deficit and tries to
compensate for it.
Contextual knowledge, such as knowledge about the behavior of
state governments and the effects of enforcement (or its lack) comes slowly
over time. This kind of knowledge is often important to wise constitutional
judgment. Yet, this sort of knowledge frequently goes far beyond the
experience of litigants.461 Individual injury may be quite irrelevant or even
distorting.462 The Court may need information about institutional
tendencies that experienced politicians or other government employees may
understand much better than even the cleverest Supreme Court Justices
(unless they had broad recent prior experience).463 And the Court, trapped
as it is in a routine of considering lawyers’ arguments, may get very
distorted views of these sorts of questions.464 Similarly judges should avoid
459

See Alden, 527 U.S. at 757 (“established rules provide ample means to correct
ongoing violations of the law”).
460
See Alden, 527 U.S. at 810 (Souter J., dissenting) (expressing skepticism about
the capacity of the federal government to enforce the Fair Labor Standards Act); Daniel J.
Meltzer, Overcoming Immunity: The Case of Federal Regulation of Intellectual Property,,
53 STAN. L. REV. 1331 (2001) (discussing problems with remedies remaining after the
Court disallowed damage suits against states for violation of intellectual property law).
461
See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20 n. 21, 21 n. 23, 29 n. 31 (1976)
(drawing on various sources of statistical information that go beyond the litigants’
experience).
462

See, e.g., id. at 34 n. 40 (discussing experience of small political parties before
the Court in obtaining contributions, but conceding that their past experience may not
capture the future effects of the new campaign finance law); Virginia v. American
Booksellers Association, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 395 (1988) (declining to rely on lower court
construction of statute prohibiting sale of books “harmful to minors”, because the
bookstore owners who testified below were unfamiliar with the statutory definition of this
term). Cf. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 6 n. 7, 11 n. 15 (1977) (Court focuses on total
cost of providing a benefit to all aliens, not to consequences for the particular alien
challenging denial of benefits).
463
See Abner J. Mikva, Why Judges Should not be Advisegivers: A Response to
Professor Neal Katyal, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1825, 1826-1832 (1998) (explaining why judges
lack the capacity to give useful advise to legislative bodies). See, e.g., Friends of the Earth
v. Laidlaw Environ. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000) (deferring to Congressional judgment
that penalties deter future violations); Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 148 (1940)
(Frankfurter, J.) (deferring to legislative judgment about what remedies adequately deter
unlawful conduct).
464
See Mikva, supra note 463, at 1829 (contrasting legislative and judicial
processes for obtaining information and advice). Cf. Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History
and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN.
(continued...)
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misplaced concreteness, the rendering of a broad ruling responsive to
atypical facts shown in the case before the Court, rather than through
consideration of the full range of relevant factors.
This suggests that justices need humility about their capacity to
make good judgments.465 Such humility should make justices more eager
to add context when they can or to defer to coordinate branches of
government. And it should lead to some caution.
An insistence upon injured litigants cannot substitute for these sorts
of habits. Wise adjudication ultimately depends upon the Court’s wisdom
when it reaches the merits.
CONCLUSION
Courts and commentators have exaggerated the functional value
of having injured litigants before them in public law cases. Injured
plaintiffs help define the merits of some controversies, but public law
properly depends upon some blend of formal legal analysis and
pragmatic policy judgments that go far beyond the context any litigant’s
experience provides.
This has a number of implications. First, it eliminates, at least in
many cases, the principal rationale linking the current doctrine of
standing to the constitution. Second, it calls attention to the neglected
habits of mind and practices that might help attain the virtues that
concreteness requirements have sought to create through justiciability
limits. Third, it sheds light on the nature of public law litigation.
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(...continued)
L. REV. 1833, 1858 (1998) (explaining how reliance on lawyers led to misunderstanding
of legislative history in a landmark case); Scharpf, supra note 389, at 524-527 (discussing
approvingly a German practice of systematically incorporating a wide information base
into constitutional litigation).
465
See Fiss, supra note 33, at 45 (self-righteousness limits a judge’s capacity to
perform adequately).

